A TUS PATCH rejected before its body was read left the client still streaming
a chunk. net/http gives up draining an unread request body after 256KiB and
then closes the connection, so the status we replied with was lost and the
browser saw a bare transport error instead. The client could not tell a
conflict from a network fault, retried blindly, and the upload stalled after
the first chunk — while curl, which reads the response as it writes, still
reported the status and appeared to work. Drain what is left of a rejected
chunk so the answer arrives on a connection that stays usable. The explicit
r.Body.Close() had to go with it: it ran before the drain, and the server
closes the request body itself once the handler returns.
Pressing Upload awaited a recursive listing of the whole destination subtree
before a single byte was sent, with no sign that anything was happening. On a
large destination that reads as a dead button, and the walk kept running after
the client gave up, then reported the failed write as a 500. A flat upload can
only collide with a direct child of the destination, so walk recursively only
for folder uploads, stop the walk once the request is done, and show the action
as busy while the destination is checked.
Along the way: a failed upload was credited as fully sent, so the progress bar
reported 100% when nothing had been written; the progress timer was recreated
without clearing the previous one; and the chunk size field threw on a value
with no unit and raced its own debounce on submit, so it appeared to refuse
every change.
Fixes#6006
Refs #5987
Two usernames that normalize to the same home directory must not both be
provisioned when their requests are handled concurrently. Also cover that
an explicit, non-derived scope may still be legitimately shared.
Refs GHSA-j7jh-37pf-mf8h
The check that stops two usernames normalizing to the same home directory
ran as a storage operation separate from the save, so two first-time users
provisioned concurrently could both observe a free scope and both be saved
into it, ending up sharing one home directory.
Move the check into users.Storage.SaveProvisioned, which holds a single
lock across the lookup and the save, and reduce CreateUserHome to deriving
and creating the directory. This covers all three provisioning paths:
signup, proxy auth and hook auth.
Refs GHSA-j7jh-37pf-mf8h
Unit tests for Settings.CreateUserHome (derives a per-user home, rejects a
colliding scope, preserves an explicit scope) plus proxy and hook regression
tests asserting that with CreateUserDir enabled two provisioned users receive
distinct home directories instead of the server root.
Refs GHSA-j7jh-37pf-mf8h, GHSA-j2fc-28fx-hc8q
The TUS PATCH handler copied the whole request body to disk and used the
declared Upload-Length only to decide when the upload was complete. A client
could declare a tiny Upload-Length and then stream an arbitrarily large body
in a single PATCH, writing it all to disk, so any user with create permission
could exhaust the filesystem.
Bound each write to the bytes still expected (Upload-Length - Upload-Offset),
reject a PATCH whose offset already exceeds the declared length, and roll back
and reject a body that exceeds it. This complements the existing negative
Upload-Length handling.
Refs GHSA-ffv3-7h97-993q
The in-memory upload cache deleted expired incomplete uploads with a raw
os.Remove on the absolute path it had stored, bypassing ScopedFs entirely.
Because the stored path is only lexically cleaned (no symlink evaluation) and
os.Remove resolves symlinked parent directories, a Create-only user could
register an upload and then, within the 3-minute TTL, swap an in-scope
ancestor directory for a symlink so the eviction deleted an arbitrary file
outside their scope.
Carry a removal callback with each cache entry and invoke it on eviction
instead of os.Remove. For TUS uploads the callback deletes via the uploading
user's scoped filesystem, whose Remove is guarded by the same within() check
that CVE-2026-55667 added, so eviction can no longer follow a symlink out of
scope. The redis backend ignores the callback (it never deleted partial files).
Refs GHSA-m9f5-2232-frp6
The ?checksum= branch of the resource GET handler read the whole file to
compute its digest and returned it without checking Perm.Download, unlike the
sibling raw, preview, subtitle and X-Encoding paths. A user provisioned with
Perm.Download=false could therefore obtain md5/sha1/sha256/sha512 digests of
files they are not allowed to download, giving a file-content hash oracle, and
force a full-file read.
Return 202 Accepted before computing the checksum when the user lacks
Perm.Download, matching the other read paths. This completes the fix for
CVE-2026-35606, whose original patch gated only the content-returning paths.
Refs GHSA-7whw-q6gh-xr59
GetByScope compared scopes with a case-sensitive exact match, so on a
case-insensitive filesystem two accounts whose scopes differ only in case
(e.g. /users/CaseVictim and /users/casevictim) were treated as distinct even
though both resolve to the same physical home directory. The second account
could then read, overwrite and delete the first account's files.
Match the scope case-insensitively so the collision check performed during
signup, proxy and hook provisioning catches these aliases and rejects the
duplicate.
Refs GHSA-576v-w77m-gr84
Proxy- and hook-authenticated users were auto-provisioned by applying the
default scope (".") and passing it straight to MakeUserDir, which normalizes
"." to "/". With CreateUserDir enabled, every provisioned user therefore
received the server root as its scope instead of a per-user home directory,
letting one user read, overwrite and delete another user's files.
The signup handler already cleared the scope before deriving the home
directory. Centralize that logic into Settings.CreateUserHome (clear the
scope when CreateUserDir is on and no explicit scope was supplied, derive the
home dir, then reject a scope already owned by another user) and use it from
signup, proxy and hook auth so the three provisioning paths cannot diverge.
Refs GHSA-j7jh-37pf-mf8h, GHSA-j2fc-28fx-hc8q
DeleteWithPathPrefix queried the share index with the raw path, so deleting a
directory through a trailing-slash path (e.g. DELETE /api/resources/a/) only
matched descendants like /a/child and missed the exact /a share, leaving it in
storage. If the same path was later recreated, the stale public share re-exposed
the new content. Normalize the path before the prefix query so the exact share
and its descendants are both removed. Adds a regression test.
The share management endpoints serialized the storage struct directly, returning
the bcrypt password_hash (crackable offline) and the bypass token for every
share an authenticated caller could list, with admins seeing them for all users.
Return a response DTO that exposes only whether a share is password-protected
(hasPassword) and drops both secrets. The storage struct keeps its tags so the
secrets stay persisted and the server-side auth/public flows are unchanged.
Updates the frontend to use hasPassword and adds a regression test.
cleanUsername is many-to-one, so distinct usernames (e.g. "teamone/x" and
"teamone-x") can normalize to the same home directory. With CreateUserDir
enabled, the second registrant silently reused the first user's directory,
breaking per-user isolation. Add a GetByScope lookup and reject a signup whose
derived scope is already taken. The check is gated on CreateUserDir: when it is
off, signups intentionally share the configured default scope. Adds a regression
test for the colliding-username case.
