super-productivity/electron/plugin-node-executor.ts
Johannes Millan 4a99e7e505
fix(security): stored XSS → RCE chain — note image, plugin nodeExecution, CSP (GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph) (#8178)
* fix(ui): prevent stored XSS in enlarge-img directive

The enlarged-image element was built by interpolating the image URL into an innerHTML string, so a crafted synced/imported note.imgUrl could break out of the src attribute and inject an event handler (stored DOM-XSS). Build the <img> with createElement and property assignment instead, so the URL is never parsed as HTML. Adds a regression spec.

Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph

* fix(plugins): authorize nodeExecution from main-process state

The Electron main process authorized Node execution from the manifest the renderer passes on each IPC call, and window.ea.pluginExecNodeScript is callable by any renderer code — so injected renderer JS could forge {permissions:['nodeExecution']} and run arbitrary Node (CWE-501).

The main process now keeps its own grantedPlugins set, populated via a dedicated PLUGIN_SET_NODE_CONSENT channel. The renderer registers a grant in _fireOnReady (before the first node call, covering every load path including zip upload) and revokes it on teardown. The executor requires set membership.

Defense in depth, not a hard boundary: the registration channel is itself renderer-reachable, so a fully-compromised renderer could register a grant itself. It blocks the disclosed PoC (forged manifest for a never-loaded plugin) and removes per-call manifest trust. A hard boundary needs a main-process consent dialog.

Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph

* fix(security): add object-src 'none' and document CSP constraints

Adds object-src 'none' (the app embeds no <object>/<embed>) and replaces the stale TODO with an accurate note on why 'unsafe-eval'/'unsafe-inline' cannot be dropped yet: the plugin runtime and the inline bootstrap script use new Function, and the packaged app loads the renderer over file:// (opaque origin), so tightening script-src to 'self' is unreliable.

Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph
2026-06-08 20:20:17 +02:00

280 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { BrowserWindow, ipcMain } from 'electron';
import { spawn } from 'child_process';
import * as vm from 'vm';
import { IPC } from './shared-with-frontend/ipc-events.const';
import {
PluginNodeScriptRequest,
PluginNodeScriptResult,
PluginManifest,
} from '../packages/plugin-api/src/types';
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30000; // 30 seconds
const MAX_TIMEOUT = 300000; // 5 minutes
class PluginNodeExecutor {
/**
* Authoritative set of plugin IDs the renderer has registered as having
* user-granted nodeExecution consent. Held in the main process so node
* execution is authorized from our own state — NOT from the manifest the
* renderer passes on each call, which a compromised/XSS'd renderer could
* forge ({ permissions: ['nodeExecution'] }). See GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph.
*
* In-memory by design: it resets on app restart and the renderer re-registers
* each consented plugin when it re-activates it on boot.
*/
private readonly grantedPlugins = new Set<string>();
constructor() {
this.setupIpcHandler();
}
private setupIpcHandler(): void {
// Trusted out-of-band channel: the renderer registers (or revokes) a
// plugin's nodeExecution grant here, separately from the exec call, after
// it has verified user consent.
ipcMain.handle(
IPC.PLUGIN_SET_NODE_CONSENT,
(_event, pluginId: string, isGranted: boolean) => {
if (typeof pluginId !== 'string' || !pluginId) {
throw new Error('Invalid pluginId');
}
if (isGranted) {
this.grantedPlugins.add(pluginId);
} else {
this.grantedPlugins.delete(pluginId);
}
},
);
ipcMain.handle(
IPC.PLUGIN_EXEC_NODE_SCRIPT,
async (
event,
pluginId: string,
manifest: PluginManifest,
request: PluginNodeScriptRequest,
) => {
const window = BrowserWindow.fromWebContents(event.sender);
if (!window) {
throw new Error('No window found for event sender');
}
// SECURITY: authorize from main-process-held state, not the per-call
// manifest the renderer supplies (the renderer-supplied manifest is not
// trustworthy — CWE-501). The manifest check is kept only as a secondary
// sanity gate. See GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph.
if (!this.grantedPlugins.has(pluginId)) {
throw new Error('Plugin is not authorized for nodeExecution');
}
if (!manifest.permissions?.includes('nodeExecution')) {
throw new Error('Plugin does not have nodeExecution permission');
}
return await this.executeScript(pluginId, request);
},
);
}
private async executeScript(
pluginId: string,
request: PluginNodeScriptRequest,
): Promise<PluginNodeScriptResult> {
const startTime = Date.now();
try {
// Validate request
this.validateScriptRequest(request);
// Try direct execution first (faster, safer)
if (this.canExecuteDirectly(request.script)) {
const result = await this.executeDirectly(request.script, request.args);
return {
success: true,
result,
executionTime: Date.now() - startTime,
};
}
// For complex scripts, use spawned process
const result = await this.executeViaSpawn(
request.script,
request.args,
request.timeout,
);
return {
success: true,
result,
executionTime: Date.now() - startTime,
};
} catch (error) {
return {
success: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
executionTime: Date.now() - startTime,
};
}
}
private validateScriptRequest(request: PluginNodeScriptRequest): void {
if (!request.script || typeof request.script !== 'string') {
throw new Error('Script must be a non-empty string');
}
if (request.script.length > 100000) {
throw new Error('Script too large (max 100KB)');
}
if (request.timeout !== undefined) {
if (typeof request.timeout !== 'number' || request.timeout < 0) {
throw new Error('Timeout must be a positive number');
}
if (request.timeout > MAX_TIMEOUT) {
throw new Error(`Timeout exceeds maximum allowed (${MAX_TIMEOUT}ms)`);
}
}
}
private canExecuteDirectly(script: string): boolean {
// Check if script only uses safe operations
const dangerousPatterns =
/require\s*\(\s*['"`](?!fs|path|os)[^'"]+['"`]\s*\)|child_process|exec|spawn|eval|Function|process\.exit/;
return !dangerousPatterns.test(script);
}
private async executeDirectly(script: string, args?: unknown[]): Promise<unknown> {
// Safe modules
const fs = await import('fs');
const path = await import('path');
const os = await import('os');
// Create sandboxed context
const sandbox = {
require: (module: string) => {
if (module === 'fs') return fs;
if (module === 'path') return path;
if (module === 'os') return os;
throw new Error(`Module '${module}' is not allowed`);
},
console: {
log: (...logArgs: unknown[]) => console.log('[Plugin]:', ...logArgs),
error: (...errorArgs: unknown[]) => console.error('[Plugin]:', ...errorArgs),
},
JSON,
args: args || [],
__result: undefined,
};
// Execute in VM with timeout
const context = vm.createContext(sandbox);
const script_wrapped = `
(async function() {
const result = await (async function() {
${script}
})();
__result = result;
})().catch(err => { throw err; });
`;
await vm.runInContext(script_wrapped, context, {
timeout: 5000, // 5 second timeout for direct execution
});
return sandbox.__result;
}
private async executeViaSpawn(
script: string,
args?: unknown[],
timeout?: number,
): Promise<unknown> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const timeoutMs = Math.min(timeout || DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, MAX_TIMEOUT);
// Wrap script for security
const wrappedScript = `
'use strict';
(async function() {
const args = ${JSON.stringify(args || [])};
try {
const result = await (async function() {
${script}
})();
console.log(JSON.stringify({ __result: result }));
} catch (error) {
console.error(JSON.stringify({
__error: error.message || String(error)
}));
process.exit(1);
}
})();
`;
// Use electron's node or system node
const nodePath = process.execPath.includes('electron') ? process.execPath : 'node';
// Spawn process with script via -e flag (no temp files!)
const child = spawn(nodePath, ['--no-warnings', '-e', wrappedScript], {
env: {
NODE_ENV: 'production',
ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE: '1',
},
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let killed = false;
// Timeout
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
killed = true;
child.kill('SIGTERM');
// Force kill after a short delay if process doesn't terminate
setTimeout(() => {
if (!child.killed) {
child.kill('SIGKILL');
}
}, 1000);
reject(new Error(`Script execution timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
}, timeoutMs);
child.stdout.on('data', (data) => {
stdout += data.toString();
});
child.stderr.on('data', (data) => {
stderr += data.toString();
});
child.on('error', (err) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(new Error('Failed to execute script: ' + err.message));
});
child.on('close', (code) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
if (killed) return;
try {
if (stdout) {
const parsed = JSON.parse(stdout.trim());
if (parsed.__error) {
reject(new Error(parsed.__error));
} else {
resolve(parsed.__result);
}
} else if (code !== 0) {
reject(new Error(stderr || `Process exited with code ${code}`));
} else {
resolve(undefined);
}
} catch (e) {
reject(new Error(`Failed to parse output: ${e}`));
}
});
});
}
}
export const pluginNodeExecutor = new PluginNodeExecutor();