SuperSync E2EE (AES-256-GCM) authenticates only op.payload; envelope fields including op.entityIds travel as plaintext. The two [TASK] LWW Update meta-reducers trusted meta.entityIds (copied from that envelope) to decide which tasks to relocate, so a compromised sync server could inject victim ids and relocate arbitrary tasks. GHSA-8pxh-mgc7-gp3g. Carry the deterministic move footprint (#9001) inside the encrypted, authenticated payload as LwwUpdatePayload.projectMoveFootprint: - createLWWUpdateOp writes the footprint to both op.entityIds (the server still needs plaintext ids for its indexed conflict detection and cannot read the ciphertext) and payload.projectMoveFootprint. - convertOpToAction surfaces the authenticated copy onto meta.moveFootprint (mirrors the recreatesEntityAfterDelete pattern). - Both LWW-TASK reducers (project repair + section membership) read meta.moveFootprint via a shared parseMoveFootprint helper and no longer trust meta.entityIds. Legacy ops without the field fall back to receiving-state repair. - getTaskProjectMoveEntityIds (footprint re-derivation during conflict resolution, fed remote ops) reads the authenticated payload instead of op.entityIds, so a tampered remote envelope cannot be laundered into a freshly-authenticated merged op. Covers the disjoint-merge, local-win, and superseded-op callers via one choke point. Additive optional field: forward/backward compatible, no crypto or envelope-version change. The DELETE/archive (bulk-archive-filter) and conflict-detection (get-op-entity-ids) envelope reads are suppression- only, not relocation, and remain for the durable AAD hardening. |
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| tests | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| package.json | ||
| README.md | ||
| tsconfig.build.json | ||
| tsconfig.json | ||
| tsconfig.spec.json | ||
| tsup.config.ts | ||
| vitest.config.ts | ||
@sp/sync-core
Framework-agnostic primitives for the Super Productivity sync engine: operation-log types, vector clocks, conflict resolution, gzip compression, and end-to-end encryption. Consumed by the main app and the SuperSync server; no Angular/Electron/Capacitor dependencies.
Encryption
The encryption layer provides Argon2id key derivation and AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption, with a WebCrypto path and an @noble/ciphers fallback for environments where crypto.subtle is unavailable (notably Android Capacitor on http://localhost).
import {
encrypt,
decrypt,
encryptBatch,
decryptBatch,
clearSessionKeyCache,
setLegacyKdfWarningHandler,
} from '@sp/sync-core';
const cipher = await encrypt('hello', password);
const plain = await decrypt(cipher, password);
Wire format (public contract)
| Format | Bytes |
|---|---|
| Argon2id | [SALT (16)] [IV (12)] [AES-GCM ciphertext + auth tag (>= 16)] |
| Legacy | [IV (12)] [AES-GCM ciphertext + auth tag (>= 16)] |
All ciphertexts are base64-encoded for transport. The format is discriminated by length: < 28 bytes is invalid, < 44 bytes is unambiguously legacy, >= 44 bytes is treated as Argon2id with a legacy fallback on auth failure. Do not change this without a versioning migration.
Salt and IV semantics
- The IV (12 bytes) is freshly random per call. AES-GCM security under a fixed key reduces to IV uniqueness, which this guarantees.
- The salt (16 bytes) is derived once per
(process session, password)pair and reused across everyencrypt/encryptBatchcall in that session. This is intentional — it lets the session cache amortize the ~500 ms–2 s Argon2id derivation. Two encryptions of the same plaintext within a session therefore share the salt prefix and differ only in IV and ciphertext. Do not assert per-call salt uniqueness in tests.
Session key caching
encrypt/decrypt/encryptBatch/decryptBatch all share three in-memory caches (encrypt key, decrypt key by salt, legacy PBKDF2 key) that survive across sync cycles. Argon2id derivation is expensive (~500–2000 ms on mobile with the default 64 MiB / 3 iterations); the cache turns repeated syncs from minutes into seconds.
Call clearSessionKeyCache() whenever the user changes their password or logs out. Keys live in memory only and are never persisted.
Legacy-KDF migration
Old data was encrypted with PBKDF2 using the password as its own salt — cryptographically weak. decrypt() and decryptBatch() still read legacy ciphertexts so existing sync data remains accessible.
setLegacyKdfWarningHandler(fn) registers a callback fired on every successful legacy decrypt, regardless of which entry point was used. The host throttles user-facing messages (e.g. show a deprecation banner once per session).
Argon2id parameters
Defaults are OWASP 2023 mobile guidance (parallelism: 1, iterations: 3, memorySize: 64 MiB). Tests can weaken them via setArgon2ParamsForTesting({ ... }) — this throws when called with NODE_ENV === 'production' in Node bundles. Restore defaults by calling with no argument.
Other exports
OpType,Operation,VectorClockand friends — op-log primitive typescompareVectorClocks,mergeVectorClocks,limitVectorClockSize— clock algebraclassifyOpAgainstSyncImport— full-state-import op dispositioncreateSyncFilePrefixHelpers— host-configured file prefix codeccompressWithGzip,decompressGzipFromString— gzip helpersreplayOperationBatch,applyRemoteOperations— replay and apply coordinatorsplanRegularOpsAfterFullStateUpload,planSnapshotHydration, etc. — sync planning
See src/index.ts for the full barrel and the JSDoc on individual symbols for usage.
Tests
npm test # typecheck specs + vitest run, Node WebCrypto + @noble fallback
npm run test:watch # watch mode
npm run build # tsup -> ESM + CJS + .d.ts
Browser-context smoke coverage lives in the consuming app at src/app/op-log/encryption/encryption.browser.spec.ts (Karma + real Chrome).