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610ca64894
* fix(sync): harden file-based .bak recovery and split gap detection Post-merge review of the SPAP-8/9/10/11 series found five defects in the file-based sync adapter; all fixed here with regression tests proven red/green against the previous code. Design cross-checked by a 7-reviewer multi-agent pass; its findings are folded in. - Split gap detection suppressed a syncVersion reset when the remote clock was EQUAL OR GREATER_THAN the last-seen clock — the exact bug the SPAP-9 review follow-up removed from the single-file path. A dominating client's snapshot reset (which compacts ops this client never saw) was treated as cosmetic, skipping snapshot hydration and silently diverging. Now EQUAL only, matching the single-file path. - .bak recovery staged the CORRUPT primary's rev, which setLastServerSeq then promoted to _lastSeenRevs: every later poll's SPAP-10 pre-check read "unchanged" and skipped the re-download while the upload path (no .bak recovery) kept failing on the corrupt primary — sync wedged until another client rewrote the file. A recovery download now never stages/promotes the rev (each poll re-recovers and re-seeds the heal cache), and every site that rewrites _lastSeenRevs drops any stale staged rev via the shared _commitLastSeenRev. - Snapshot uploads (force-upload / "Use Local" / E2EE re-encryption) left the pre-snapshot .bak behind. After a password rotation the stale old-key .bak was silently "recovered" by a still-old-key client (suppressing its wrong-password prompt) and heal-uploaded back over the new-key primary, reverting the rotation. Snapshot uploads now write the same payload to .bak FIRST, then the primary (_forceUploadWithBakFirst; deliberately FATAL — aborting pre-primary leaves the remote consistent for a retry). Applies to sync-data.json.bak and sync-ops.json.bak; sync-state.json.bak is deliberately exempt: its adoption is ref-validated (EQUAL clock vs snapshotRef), so a stale copy is inert, and it must keep serving the compaction crash window it exists for. - Recovery additionally refuses a PLAINTEXT .bak when encryption is expected: decoding trusts the file's own prefix flags, so a plaintext .bak decodes even under a wrong/rotated key — the same wrong-password-suppression class via mode (rather than key) mismatch. - The split migration wrote the v3 tombstone BEFORE neutralizing the legacy .bak (best-effort): a crash between the writes left a live v2 .bak that an OFF client's recovery would resurrect over the tombstone, forking the folder. Neutralize-first, fatal. Residual: a step-3 failure after the migration's ops-file commit leaves a live v2 file until the next snapshot upload (documented at the call site). - sync-ops.json — the hot file, rewritten on every op-bearing sync — had no backup at all, so a torn write wedged split sync until a manual force-upload. It now gets the same backup-before-overwrite + recovery + heal treatment as the single-file format. deleteAllData deletes the split files BEFORE the tombstone and treats source-of-truth deletion failures as errors (success:false) — it previously left every split file behind and reported success. The three backup/recover pairs are collapsed into shared _writeBakFile / _readBakFile helpers (the EQUAL||GREATER_THAN divergence above is exactly the copy-drift failure mode this prevents); .bak file names move into FILE_BASED_SYNC_CONSTANTS as remote-format surface. * fix(sync): show the exact pending-op count in the conflict dialog Compaction can fold still-unsynced ops into the snapshot baseline clock, so the dialog's vector-clock delta could report "0 changes" right next to "N local changes pending" — and the false 0 skipped the secondary USE_REMOTE overwrite confirmation. The dialog now prefers the EXACT pending-op count carried on LocalDataConflictError (new optional ConflictData.localUnsyncedOpsCount): it is precisely "what USE_REMOTE would discard", so both the displayed count and the >= 20-difference confirmation threshold work from a truthful figure; the clock delta remains the fallback when no measured count is supplied. Display/confirmation-only — no clock or op-log semantics touched. Also asserts the explicit-null lastSyncedVectorClock contract at the fresh-client conflict throw sites (test gap from SPAP-7). * chore(lint): enforce tx-handle-only access in op-log transactions The SQLite op-log adapter serializes every entry point through a per-connection FIFO queue; awaiting an adapter method inside a .transaction() callback enqueues behind the transaction's own slot and silently deadlocks all op-log persistence. The port contract documents the precondition and #8849 promised a lint rule — this adds it (no-adapter-in-tx, scoped to src/app/op-log) with RuleTester specs. Matching is rename-proof: it flags access on the SAME receiver the transaction was opened on (plain identifiers and any `this.<field>`), so it does not depend on the field being named `_adapter`; known heuristic gaps (extracted callbacks, aliasing, method indirection) are documented. Also corrects the port doc: IndexedDB serializes only overlapping-scope transactions; SQLite provides the stronger whole-connection exclusion.
18 lines
671 B
JavaScript
18 lines
671 B
JavaScript
/**
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* Local ESLint rules for Super Productivity.
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*
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* These rules are loaded by eslint-plugin-local-rules.
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* Usage in .eslintrc.json:
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* "plugins": ["local-rules"],
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* "rules": {
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* "local-rules/require-hydration-guard": "warn",
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* "local-rules/require-entity-registry": "warn"
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* }
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*/
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module.exports = {
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'require-hydration-guard': require('./rules/require-hydration-guard'),
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'require-entity-registry': require('./rules/require-entity-registry'),
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'no-actions-in-effects': require('./rules/no-actions-in-effects'),
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'no-multi-entity-effect': require('./rules/no-multi-entity-effect'),
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'no-adapter-in-tx': require('./rules/no-adapter-in-tx'),
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};
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