* feat(plugins): allow uploaded nodeExecution behind consent gate
Re-open the nodeExecution permission for uploaded/community plugins
(previously built-in only, #8205) behind the existing main-process
consent dialog. Phase 1 of #8512; unblocks the Super Productivity MCP
plugin (discussion #8385).
- Main process sanitizes the attacker-controlled plugin id and the
self-declared name/version before they reach the consent dialog or
the grant map (control/bidi/whitespace rejected, length-capped).
- Bundled vs uploaded is decided by the on-disk manifest, never a
renderer-supplied flag, so uploaded code can't borrow a built-in
plugin's verified name.
- Uploaded-plugin dialog anchors on the validated id, flags the plugin
as unverified third-party with full machine access / no sandbox, and
defaults to Deny.
- Revoke is main-authoritative by (pluginId, webContents) so a re-upload
reusing an id can't inherit a live session grant.
- Consent stays session-scoped: an in-memory, never-synced denied set
prevents re-prompt storms; deny keeps the plugin enabled but fails
node calls closed until re-enable or restart.
Refs #8512#8385
* fix(plugins): reject path-segment ids in nodeExecution consent gate
Multi-agent review of the Phase 1 gate found the uploaded plugin id —
used as a path component in the bundled-manifest existsSync probe — was
not rejecting path separators or dot-segments. Impact was bounded (the
verified-builtin branch re-validates with the strict kebab regex before
any read, so no code exec / file read / dialog spoof), but `..` / `/`
left a filesystem-existence oracle and rendered misleadingly as the
dialog "Plugin ID". assertSafePluginId now rejects `/`, `\`, `.`, `..`.
Also from review: factor the shared Allow/Deny dialog shell, and correct
the denied-cache comment (the existing token short-circuit handles the
multi-call-site case; the cache only makes a denial sticky across a later
non-interactive grant re-entry). Documents the uploaded-id constraints.
Refs #8512
* fix(plugins): harden uploaded nodeExecution consent gate (review follow-ups)
Addresses multi-agent review findings on the uploaded-plugin nodeExecution
consent gate:
- id validation: use an allowlist (/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$/) instead of a
Unicode denylist, closing bidi/zero-width/homoglyph dialog-anchor spoofing the
range list missed (U+061C, U+2060, U+3164, fullwidth chars); strip all Unicode
control+format chars from the self-declared display name/version.
- never upgrade trust: describeVerifiedBuiltInDialog returns null on any imperfect
on-disk verification (id mismatch, missing permission, unreadable manifest) and
the grant handler falls back to the unverified dialog, so a colliding uploaded id
can never borrow a built-in's verified dialog.
- reserve the gitea/linear/trello/azure-devops issue-provider bundled ids (they had
drifted out of BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS, leaving an impersonation gap) and guard the
BUNDLED_PLUGIN_PATHS subset-of BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS invariant with a node test.
- key the revoke and exec IPC handlers through the same assertSafePluginId as the
grant handler so the "revoke by id on teardown/re-upload" guarantee can't drift.
- clear the session nodeExecution denial when a plugin is uninstalled, so a fresh
re-upload of the same id is prompted again rather than silently failing closed.
- de-duplicate the PluginNodeExecutionElectronApi interface into a single
electron/shared-with-frontend model (was copied byte-identically in two files).
* fix(plugins): harden node execution grants
* fix(plugins): harden iframe bridge boundaries (#8208)
* fix(plugins): harden iframe bridge boundaries
* fix(plugins): tighten iframe bridge follow-up
* test(plugins): make node-executor electron test hermetic
The new plugin-node-executor test read the real built-in plugin manifest
(src/assets/bundled-plugins/sync-md/manifest.json), which is a build
artifact absent when 'npm run test:electron' runs in CI (before the
frontend/plugin build). Stub the manifest read, scoped to the executor
module via Module._load, so the grant/token/webContents assertions no
longer depend on built plugin assets.
* fix(plugins): allow iframe formatDate & getCurrentLanguage i18n methods
The iframe API allow-list gate added in #8208 only listed a subset of
the i18n methods that master's #8146 exposes to iframe plugins. Without
this, plugin calls to formatDate/getCurrentLanguage (and translate) are
rejected with 'Unknown API method'. Add all three so the merged gate
matches the methods createBoundMethods/createPluginApiScript expose.
* docs(plugins): document node-exec handoff bootstrap-ordering invariant
The one-shot consumePluginNodeExecutionApi() handoff is defended by
construction ordering, not structural isolation: PluginBridgeService must
consume it before any plugin 'new Function' code runs (both share window.ea
in one renderer realm). Document the invariant at the consumption site so a
future lazy-service/early-plugin-load refactor can't silently regress it.
Surfaced by the post-merge security review (latent finding; not currently
exploitable).
* fix(plugins): use static iframe sandbox attribute to avoid NG0910
Binding a security-sensitive iframe attribute (sandbox) via [attr.sandbox]
makes Angular throw RuntimeError NG0910 and tear down the iframe, crashing
the plugin view to the global error screen. This broke the plugin-iframe,
plugin-loading and plugin-lifecycle e2e tests.
Restore the static sandbox attribute (still without allow-same-origin, so
the opaque-origin isolation from #8208 is preserved) and drop the now-unused
iframeSandbox binding/import.
* fix(ui): prevent stored XSS in enlarge-img directive
The enlarged-image element was built by interpolating the image URL into an innerHTML string, so a crafted synced/imported note.imgUrl could break out of the src attribute and inject an event handler (stored DOM-XSS). Build the <img> with createElement and property assignment instead, so the URL is never parsed as HTML. Adds a regression spec.
Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph
* fix(plugins): authorize nodeExecution from main-process state
The Electron main process authorized Node execution from the manifest the renderer passes on each IPC call, and window.ea.pluginExecNodeScript is callable by any renderer code — so injected renderer JS could forge {permissions:['nodeExecution']} and run arbitrary Node (CWE-501).
The main process now keeps its own grantedPlugins set, populated via a dedicated PLUGIN_SET_NODE_CONSENT channel. The renderer registers a grant in _fireOnReady (before the first node call, covering every load path including zip upload) and revokes it on teardown. The executor requires set membership.
Defense in depth, not a hard boundary: the registration channel is itself renderer-reachable, so a fully-compromised renderer could register a grant itself. It blocks the disclosed PoC (forged manifest for a never-loaded plugin) and removes per-call manifest trust. A hard boundary needs a main-process consent dialog.
Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph
* fix(security): add object-src 'none' and document CSP constraints
Adds object-src 'none' (the app embeds no <object>/<embed>) and replaces the stale TODO with an accurate note on why 'unsafe-eval'/'unsafe-inline' cannot be dropped yet: the plugin runtime and the inline bootstrap script use new Function, and the packaged app loads the renderer over file:// (opaque origin), so tightening script-src to 'self' is unreliable.
Refs: GHSA-78rv-m663-4fph
Enable plugins to access the Node.js 'os' module for system information
gathering alongside the existing fs and path modules.
Changes:
- Updated canExecuteDirectly() regex pattern to allow 'os' module imports
- Added os module import to executeDirectly() sandbox environment
- Extended sandbox require() function to provide access to os module
This allows plugins to access system information like platform, architecture,
memory usage, CPU info, and network interfaces through the standard Node.js
os module while maintaining the existing security restrictions.
The os module is considered safe as it provides read-only system information
and doesn't allow file system modifications or process execution.
- Add @super-productivity/plugin-api package with TypeScript definitions
- Define core plugin interfaces, types, and manifest structure
- Add plugin hooks system for event-driven architecture
- Create plugin API type definitions and constants
- Add documentation and development guidelines
