* fix(security): canonicalize file-path-guard and restrict FILE_SYNC_* to outside userData
file-path-guard now canonicalizes via fs.realpathSync.native (deepest existing
ancestor) before the path.relative check, so symlinks and case-insensitive / 8.3
filesystem aliases can't bypass containment — this also hardens the existing
backup-dir (GHSA-x937) check, which was purely lexical and bypassable on macOS.
Adds assertPathOutside and applies it to every FILE_SYNC_* handler and
READ_LOCAL_IMAGE_AS_DATA_URL in local-file-sync.ts, so the renderer (untrusted
plugin/XSS) can no longer read/write/delete/list/inline files inside the app's
private dir (userData: settings/grants/db) while user-chosen sync folders still
work.
* fix(security): validate clipboard image basePath, fileName and copy source
ipc-handler-wrapper now uses isPathInsideDir containment (not a bare startsWith,
which accepted a sibling like <userData>-evil) and rejects any fileName that is
not a plain image basename or imageId containing separators/.. — closing the
clipboard grant-file forgery (fileName='simpleSettings'). CLIPBOARD_COPY_IMAGE_FILE
now requires an image-extension source. The supported-image-extension allowlist
is consolidated into a single SUPPORTED_IMAGE_EXTENSIONS in mime-type-mapping.
* test(e2e): retry supersync time-estimate dialog until input binds
The fill('10m') could fire its `input` event before the duration input's
value-accessor (an `input` HostListener) was wired, so the typed value
never reached the model and submit() saved an empty time — the panel
stayed "-/-" and toContainText('10m') timed out (scheduled run
27197862391, SuperSync 1/6). Retry the whole open→fill→submit cycle so a
fill that didn't stick is re-applied once the control binds.
* fix(electron): restrict loadBackupData IPC to the backup directory
The BACKUP_LOAD_DATA handler passed the renderer-supplied path straight
to readFileSync with no validation. Because plugin background scripts run
via `new Function` in the renderer, any installed plugin (or an XSS
payload in task content) could read arbitrary files through
window.ea.loadBackupData('/etc/shadow').
Constrain the path to BACKUP_DIR / BACKUP_DIR_WINSTORE via a new
isPathInsideDir guard. It uses path.relative (not a startsWith string
compare) so `..` traversal is collapsed and a name-prefixed sibling
directory (backups vs backups-evil) is not mistaken for a child. The only
legitimate caller already passes paths built from BACKUP_DIR, and
getBackupPath() is display-only, so backup restore is unaffected.
Adds electron/file-path-guard.test.cjs (node --test) covering traversal
escape, prefix-sibling, absolute-outside, and normalize-stays-inside.
Refs GHSA-x937-wf3j-88q3
* docs(electron): note lexical-only containment in file-path-guard
Clarify that isPathInsideDir does string-based containment (no fs.realpath),
so a symlink planted inside the dir is out of scope — it requires local
filesystem write access, outside this guard's renderer-input threat model.
Surfaced during multi-agent review of the GHSA-x937-wf3j-88q3 fix.
* test(electron): load guard via computed path for asar require check
The electron-smoke job runs tools/verify-electron-requires.js over the
packaged app.asar, which flags literal relative require() calls that can't
resolve in the package. The new guard test had require('./file-path-guard.ts'),
but .ts source is excluded from app.asar, so the check failed. Load the module
via a computed path (require(path.resolve(__dirname, ...))) — the same pattern
the other electron *.test.cjs files use; the scanner skips computed requires.
Also reworded the comment, which had reintroduced the literal pattern (the
scanner matches raw text, comments included).
