Addresses multi-agent review findings on the uploaded-plugin nodeExecution
consent gate:
- id validation: use an allowlist (/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$/) instead of a
Unicode denylist, closing bidi/zero-width/homoglyph dialog-anchor spoofing the
range list missed (U+061C, U+2060, U+3164, fullwidth chars); strip all Unicode
control+format chars from the self-declared display name/version.
- never upgrade trust: describeVerifiedBuiltInDialog returns null on any imperfect
on-disk verification (id mismatch, missing permission, unreadable manifest) and
the grant handler falls back to the unverified dialog, so a colliding uploaded id
can never borrow a built-in's verified dialog.
- reserve the gitea/linear/trello/azure-devops issue-provider bundled ids (they had
drifted out of BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS, leaving an impersonation gap) and guard the
BUNDLED_PLUGIN_PATHS subset-of BUNDLED_PLUGIN_IDS invariant with a node test.
- key the revoke and exec IPC handlers through the same assertSafePluginId as the
grant handler so the "revoke by id on teardown/re-upload" guarantee can't drift.
- clear the session nodeExecution denial when a plugin is uninstalled, so a fresh
re-upload of the same id is prompted again rather than silently failing closed.
- de-duplicate the PluginNodeExecutionElectronApi interface into a single
electron/shared-with-frontend model (was copied byte-identically in two files).
