fix(electron): validate URL scheme before shell.openExternal/openPath (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3) (#8210)

* fix(electron): validate URL scheme before shell.openExternal (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)

Task-note Markdown links had their href passed verbatim to shell.openExternal
on click, letting note content (sync, imported backups, issue-provider data)
silently invoke any OS-registered protocol handler — ms-msdt: (Follina),
search-ms:, \\host\share (NTLM hash capture), etc. — with one click and no
prompt. Angular's sanitizer does not help: its SAFE_URL_PATTERN blocks only
javascript:, so these schemes pass.

Add a shared scheme allowlist (http/https/mailto/file) enforced at both layers:

- marked renderer (marked-options-factory): blocked-scheme links render as
  inert <span> text instead of an anchor (covers all note render paths + web).
- Electron main process, both shell.openExternal sinks: the OPEN_EXTERNAL IPC
  handler (system.ts) and openUrlInBrowser (main-window.ts, the
  will-navigate/window-open path used by the fullscreen/archived dialogs).

The allowlist lives in electron/shared-with-frontend so renderer and main agree
on one policy. Blocked links are styled muted/non-interactive with an
explanatory tooltip.

* fix(electron): harden openExternal/openPath against SMB & attribute-injection (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)

Follow-up hardening from multi-agent review of the initial fix:

- file:// SMB bypass: `file:` was allow-listed unconditionally, so
  `file://host/share` / `file:////host` reached shell.openExternal — the same
  NTLM-leak vector the raw `\\host\share` check blocked. Restrict `file:` to the
  canonical local form `file:///<path>`. Gated on the raw string because
  Chromium (renderer) and Node (main) parse file: hosts/paths differently.
- IPC.OPEN_PATH was unguarded: a synced FILE-attachment path of `\\host\share`
  leaked NTLM via shell.openPath. Reject UNC paths (new isUncPath helper).
- Attribute-injection XSS: the marked link renderer interpolated href/title
  raw; marked's angle-bracket link form could inject an event handler that runs
  under disableSanitizer. HTML-escape href/title.
- Remove the now-dead/misleading explicit backslash check and redundant
  toLowerCase (new URL already throws on raw UNC; protocol is spec-lowercase).

Adds cross-engine-verified tests for file:// SMB forms, isUncPath, and the
href quote-injection case.

* fix(electron): block remote file:// in OPEN_PATH too (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)

Re-review found the OPEN_PATH guard was incomplete: isUncPath only rejects raw
slash-prefixed paths, but shell.openPath('file://host/share') resolves to
\\host\share on Windows — the same NTLM leak. A synced FILE-attachment path is
attacker-controllable.

Centralize the path policy in isPathSafeToOpen() (rejects UNC paths and remote
file:// URLs, allows local paths and file:///) so the two sinks can't drift.

* fix(electron): gate image src against remote file:// / UNC (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)

Markdown image src auto-loads on render (no click), so a remote
file://host/share or UNC src silently triggers an SMB connection and
leaks the user's NTLM hash just by viewing a synced/imported note — the
same vector the link/openExternal gate already blocks, but with no user
interaction. CSP (img-src ... file:) does not block it.

Gate image href through isPathSafeToOpen: remote file:// and UNC srcs
render as inert (HTML-escaped) alt text instead of an <img>; local
file://, http(s), data: and blob: images are unaffected.

Also drop a dead eslint-disable directive on ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES
(the name does not trip naming-convention).

* fix(tasks): gate IMG attachment src against remote file:// / UNC (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)

An IMG-type task attachment renders <img [src]="resolvedOriginalPath">,
which auto-loads on render with no click. A synced/imported remote
file://host or UNC path there silently triggers an SMB fetch and leaks
the user's NTLM hash just by opening the task — the same no-click vector
the markdown-image gate already blocks, but via Angular template binding
(Angular's URL sanitizer does not help; SAFE_URL_PATTERN allows file:).

Drop unsafe srcs via isPathSafeToOpen so they never reach the binding;
local file://, http(s), data: and blob: images are unaffected.

---------

Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

electron/ipc-handlers/system.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,30 @@
 import { app, dialog, ipcMain, shell } from 'electron';
 import { IPC } from '../shared-with-frontend/ipc-events.const';
+import {
+  isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed,
+  isPathSafeToOpen,
+} from '../shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed';
 import { getWin } from '../main-window';
 
 export const initSystemIpc = (): void => {
-  ipcMain.on(IPC.OPEN_PATH, (ev, path: string) => shell.openPath(path));
-  ipcMain.on(IPC.OPEN_EXTERNAL, (ev, url: string) => shell.openExternal(url));
+  ipcMain.on(IPC.OPEN_PATH, (ev, path: string) => {
+    // Block UNC / network paths and remote file:// URLs: shell.openPath would
+    // resolve \\host\share (and file://host/share) to an SMB connection and leak
+    // the user's NTLM hash. FILE-type task-attachment paths are synced and thus
+    // attacker-controllable. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+    if (!isPathSafeToOpen(path)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    shell.openPath(path);
+  });
+  ipcMain.on(IPC.OPEN_EXTERNAL, (ev, url: string) => {
+    // Defense in depth: never hand an unsafe scheme to the OS handler, even if
+    // the renderer-side guard is bypassed. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+    if (!isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(url)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    shell.openExternal(url);
+  });
 
   ipcMain.on(
     IPC.SHOW_EMOJI_PANEL,

electron/main-window.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { errorHandlerWithFrontendInform } from './error-handler-with-frontend-in
 import * as path from 'path';
 import { join, normalize } from 'path';
 import { IPC } from './shared-with-frontend/ipc-events.const';
+import { isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed } from './shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed';
 import { readFileSync, stat, writeFileSync } from 'fs';
 import { error, log } from 'electron-log/main';
 import { IS_MAC, IS_GNOME_DESKTOP } from './common.const';
@@ -414,6 +415,14 @@ export const setWasMaximizedBeforeHide = (value: boolean): void => {
 // eslint-disable-next-line prefer-arrow/prefer-arrow-functions
 function initWinEventListeners(app: Electron.App): void {
   const openUrlInBrowser = (url: string): void => {
+    // Defense in depth: never hand an unsafe scheme to the OS handler, even if
+    // a renderer-side guard is bypassed (e.g. a link click that falls through
+    // to navigation rather than the explicit openExternalUrl IPC). The blocked
+    // schemes are OS protocol handlers / UNC paths. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+    if (!isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(url)) {
+      error('Refused to open URL with disallowed scheme via openExternal');
+      return;
+    }
     // needed for mac; especially for jira urls we might have a host like this www.host.de//
     const urlObj = new URL(url);
     urlObj.pathname = urlObj.pathname.replace('//', '/');

electron/shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * URL schemes that are permitted to reach the OS handler via shell.openExternal.
+ *
+ * Task notes render Markdown links whose href would otherwise be passed verbatim
+ * to the OS handler on click. Without this gate, anyone who can populate note
+ * content (multi-device sync, shared/imported backups, issue-provider content)
+ * could make a single click silently invoke any OS-registered protocol —
+ * `ms-msdt:`, `search-ms:`, etc.
+ * See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+ *
+ * Shared between the Angular renderer (link rendering) and the Electron main
+ * process (shell.openExternal call sites) so both layers enforce one policy.
+ */
+export const ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES = ['http:', 'https:', 'mailto:', 'file:'];
+
+const _isSlash = (char: string): boolean => char === '/' || char === '\\';
+
+/**
+ * True for a UNC / network path such as `\\host\share` or `//host/share` — i.e.
+ * any path whose first two characters are slashes (in either direction).
+ *
+ * Opening such a path (`shell.openPath` / `shell.openExternal('file://host/…')`)
+ * makes the OS reach out to a remote SMB host, leaking the user's NTLM hash.
+ * Local absolute paths (`/home/x`, `C:\x`) and POSIX/Windows roots are NOT UNC.
+ */
+export const isUncPath = (path: unknown): boolean => {
+  if (typeof path !== 'string') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const trimmed = path.trim();
+  return trimmed.length >= 2 && _isSlash(trimmed[0]) && _isSlash(trimmed[1]);
+};
+
+/**
+ * Returns true only for URLs whose scheme is in ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES.
+ * Schemeless/relative input and any string that fails URL parsing are rejected.
+ * `file:` is restricted to LOCAL files — a `file:` URL with a remote authority
+ * (`file://host/share`, or a path-based UNC like `file:////host/share`) is the
+ * same NTLM-hash-leak vector as a raw `\\host\share` path and is rejected.
+ */
+export const isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed = (url: unknown): boolean => {
+  if (typeof url !== 'string') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const trimmed = url.trim();
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    // Raw UNC paths (`\\host\share`, `//host`) and schemeless input throw here.
+    parsed = new URL(trimmed);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // `protocol` is always lower-cased by the WHATWG URL parser.
+  if (!ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES.includes(parsed.protocol)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (parsed.protocol === 'file:') {
+    // Allow ONLY the canonical local form `file:///<path>`. Anything with an
+    // authority (`file://host/…`) or a path-based UNC (`file:////host`) is a
+    // remote SMB reference and leaks the user's NTLM hash. Gate on the RAW
+    // string: Chromium (renderer) and Node (main) parse file: hosts/paths
+    // differently, so `parsed.host` / `parsed.pathname` are not portable.
+    const lower = trimmed.toLowerCase();
+    return lower.startsWith('file:///') && lower[8] !== '/' && lower[8] !== '\\';
+  }
+  return true;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if a value is safe to hand to `shell.openPath` (which opens a
+ * filesystem path, not a URL). Rejects UNC paths AND `file:`-scheme values with
+ * a remote authority — `shell.openPath('file://host/share')` resolves to
+ * `\\host\share` on Windows, the same NTLM-leak `isUncPath` blocks for the raw
+ * form. Plain local paths (`/home/x`, `C:\x`, `./rel`) are allowed.
+ * See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+ */
+export const isPathSafeToOpen = (path: unknown): boolean => {
+  if (typeof path !== 'string') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const trimmed = path.trim();
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (isUncPath(trimmed)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // A file:-scheme value must be a LOCAL file URL, not a remote authority.
+  if (trimmed.toLowerCase().startsWith('file:')) {
+    return isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(trimmed);
+  }
+  return true;
+};

src/app/features/tasks/task-attachment/task-attachment-list/task-attachment-list.component.spec.ts

@@ -40,6 +40,38 @@ describe('TaskAttachmentListComponent', () => {
     snackService = TestBed.inject(SnackService) as jasmine.SpyObj<SnackService>;
   });
 
+  describe('resolvedAttachments img src safety (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)', () => {
+    const imgAttachment = (path: string): TaskAttachment => ({
+      id: 'a',
+      type: 'IMG',
+      title: 'x',
+      path,
+    });
+
+    it('drops remote file:// / UNC src so the <img> cannot auto-load and leak NTLM', () => {
+      [
+        'file://192.168.1.100/share/pixel.png',
+        'file:////host/share/pixel.png',
+        '\\\\host\\share\\pixel.png',
+        '//host/share/pixel.png',
+      ].forEach((path) => {
+        fixture.componentRef.setInput('attachments', [imgAttachment(path)]);
+        expect(component.resolvedAttachments()[0].resolvedOriginalPath).toBeUndefined();
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('keeps safe srcs (local file://, http(s), data:)', () => {
+      [
+        'file:///home/user/img.png',
+        'https://example.com/img.png',
+        '',
+      ].forEach((path) => {
+        fixture.componentRef.setInput('attachments', [imgAttachment(path)]);
+        expect(component.resolvedAttachments()[0].resolvedOriginalPath).toBe(path);
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
   describe('copy', () => {
     let attachment: TaskAttachment;
     let originalClipboardDescriptor: PropertyDescriptor | undefined;

src/app/features/tasks/task-attachment/task-attachment-list/task-attachment-list.component.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { MatIcon } from '@angular/material/icon';
 import { EnlargeImgDirective } from '../../../../ui/enlarge-img/enlarge-img.directive';
 import { MatAnchor, MatButton } from '@angular/material/button';
 import { ClipboardImageService } from '../../../../core/clipboard-image/clipboard-image.service';
+import { isPathSafeToOpen } from '../../../../../../electron/shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed';
 
 interface ResolvedAttachment extends TaskAttachment {
   resolvedPath?: string;
@@ -66,9 +67,15 @@ export class TaskAttachmentListComponent {
         : att.path;
 
       const imgPath = att.originalImgPath || att.path;
-      const resolvedOriginalPath = imgPath?.startsWith('indexeddb://clipboard-images/')
+      const rawOriginalPath = imgPath?.startsWith('indexeddb://clipboard-images/')
         ? urlMap.get(imgPath) || imgPath
         : imgPath;
+      // The <img> src auto-loads on render (no click), so a synced remote
+      // file://host / UNC path would silently leak the user's NTLM hash. Drop
+      // such srcs so they never reach the binding. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+      const resolvedOriginalPath = isPathSafeToOpen(rawOriginalPath)
+        ? rawOriginalPath
+        : undefined;
 
       const isLoading =
         att.path?.startsWith('indexeddb://clipboard-images/') &&

src/app/ui/is-external-url-allowed.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+import {
+  ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES,
+  isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed,
+  isPathSafeToOpen,
+  isUncPath,
+} from '../../../electron/shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed';
+
+describe('isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed', () => {
+  describe('allowed schemes', () => {
+    const allowed = [
+      'http://example.com',
+      'https://example.com/path?q=1#frag',
+      'HTTPS://EXAMPLE.COM', // scheme is case-insensitive
+      'mailto:someone@example.com',
+      'file:///home/user/notes.txt',
+      '  https://example.com  ', // surrounding whitespace tolerated
+    ];
+    allowed.forEach((url) => {
+      it(`allows "${url}"`, () => {
+        expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(url)).toBe(true);
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('keeps the allowlist in sync with expectations', () => {
+      expect(ALLOWED_EXTERNAL_URL_SCHEMES).toEqual([
+        'http:',
+        'https:',
+        'mailto:',
+        'file:',
+      ]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('blocked schemes (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)', () => {
+    const blocked = [
+      'ms-calculator:',
+      'ms-msdt:/id PCWDiagnostic', // Follina (CVE-2022-30190)
+      'search-ms:query=foo',
+      'ms-officecmd:{}',
+      'javascript:alert(1)',
+      'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
+      'vbscript:msgbox(1)',
+      'ftp://example.com',
+      'ssh://example.com',
+      'tel:+123456789',
+      '\\\\192.168.1.100\\share', // UNC / SMB — NTLM hash capture
+      '/\\192.168.1.100\\share',
+      // file: with a remote authority is the same SMB / NTLM-leak vector and
+      // must be blocked even though `file:` is allow-listed for local files.
+      'file://192.168.1.100/share/x',
+      'file:////host/share', // path-based UNC, empty host
+      'file://///host/share',
+      'file:\\\\host\\share',
+      'FILE://HOST/share', // case-insensitive
+    ];
+    blocked.forEach((url) => {
+      it(`blocks "${url}"`, () => {
+        expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(url)).toBe(false);
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('still allows LOCAL file: URLs (Windows drive + POSIX paths)', () => {
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('file:///home/user/notes.txt')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('file:///C:/Users/me/doc.pdf')).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isUncPath', () => {
+    it('flags UNC / network paths', () => {
+      ['\\\\host\\share', '//host/share', '/\\host', '\\/host', '  \\\\host\\s'].forEach(
+        (p) => expect(isUncPath(p)).toBe(true),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('does not flag local absolute paths or non-strings', () => {
+      ['/home/user/x', 'C:\\Users\\me', './rel', '', '/', 'x', undefined, null].forEach(
+        (p) => expect(isUncPath(p as unknown as string)).toBe(false),
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('isPathSafeToOpen (shell.openPath gate)', () => {
+    it('allows local filesystem paths and local file:// URLs', () => {
+      [
+        '/home/user/doc.pdf',
+        'C:\\Users\\me\\doc.pdf',
+        './rel/x',
+        'file:///home/x',
+      ].forEach((p) => expect(isPathSafeToOpen(p)).toBe(true));
+    });
+
+    it('blocks UNC paths AND remote file:// URLs (NTLM leak via shell.openPath)', () => {
+      [
+        '\\\\host\\share',
+        '//host/share',
+        'file://host/share',
+        'file://192.168.1.100/share/x',
+        'file:////host/share',
+        '',
+        undefined,
+        null,
+      ].forEach((p) => expect(isPathSafeToOpen(p as unknown as string)).toBe(false));
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('malformed / non-string input', () => {
+    it('blocks empty and whitespace-only strings', () => {
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('   ')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks schemeless / relative input', () => {
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('example.com')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('//example.com')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed('./relative/path')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks non-string input', () => {
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(undefined)).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(42)).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed({ href: 'https://example.com' })).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+});

src/app/ui/marked-options-factory.spec.ts

@@ -352,6 +352,57 @@ describe('markedOptionsFactory', () => {
       expect(result).toContain('href="http://x" onmouseover="alert(1)"');
       expect(result).toContain('title="" onfocus="alert(2)"');
     });
+
+    // GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3: the rendered href is passed verbatim to
+    // shell.openExternal on click, so unsafe schemes must never become anchors.
+    describe('unsafe URL schemes (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)', () => {
+      const mockParser = {
+        parseInline: (tokens: any[]) =>
+          tokens.map((t: any) => t.raw || t.text || '').join(''),
+      };
+
+      ['ms-calculator:', 'javascript:alert(1)', 'ssh://h', '\\\\host\\share'].forEach(
+        (href) => {
+          it(`renders "${href}" as inert text, not an anchor`, () => {
+            const linkRenderer = options.renderer!.link.bind({ parser: mockParser });
+            const result = linkRenderer({
+              href,
+              title: 'x',
+              tokens: [{ type: 'text', raw: 'Click here', text: 'Click here' }],
+            } as any);
+            expect(result).not.toContain('<a ');
+            expect(result).not.toContain(`href="${href}"`);
+            expect(result).toContain('Click here');
+          });
+        },
+      );
+
+      it('still renders allowed schemes (mailto:, file:) as anchors', () => {
+        const linkRenderer = options.renderer!.link.bind({ parser: mockParser });
+        ['mailto:a@b.com', 'file:///tmp/x', 'https://example.com'].forEach((href) => {
+          const result = linkRenderer({
+            href,
+            title: '',
+            tokens: [{ type: 'text', raw: 'L', text: 'L' }],
+          } as any);
+          expect(result).toContain(`href="${href}"`);
+        });
+      });
+
+      it('escapes a quote-injection href so it cannot break out of the attribute', () => {
+        const linkRenderer = options.renderer!.link.bind({ parser: mockParser });
+        const result = linkRenderer({
+          href: 'https://example.com/" onmouseover="alert(1)',
+          title: 'a"b',
+          tokens: [{ type: 'text', raw: 'L', text: 'L' }],
+        } as any);
+        expect(result).not.toContain('onmouseover="alert(1)"');
+        expect(result).toContain('&quot;');
+        expect(result).toContain(
+          'href="https://example.com/&quot; onmouseover=&quot;alert(1)"',
+        );
+      });
+    });
   });
 
   describe('image renderer', () => {
@@ -472,6 +523,56 @@ describe('markedOptionsFactory', () => {
         );
       });
     });
+
+    // GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3: an image src auto-loads on render (no click), so a
+    // remote file:// / UNC src would silently leak the user's NTLM hash. Such
+    // srcs must never reach the `src` attribute.
+    describe('unsafe image src (GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3)', () => {
+      [
+        'file://192.168.1.100/share/pixel.png',
+        'file:////host/share/pixel.png',
+        '\\\\host\\share\\pixel.png',
+        '//host/share/pixel.png',
+      ].forEach((href) => {
+        it(`blocks remote/UNC src "${href}" (renders no <img>)`, () => {
+          const result = options.renderer!.image({
+            href,
+            title: null,
+            text: 'Alt text',
+          } as any);
+          expect(result).not.toContain('<img');
+          expect(result).not.toContain(`src="${href}"`);
+          expect(result).toContain('Alt text');
+        });
+      });
+
+      it('still renders local file:// and remote web/data images', () => {
+        [
+          'file:///home/user/img.png',
+          'http://example.com/img.png',
+          'https://example.com/img.png',
+          '',
+          'blob:https://example.com/abc',
+        ].forEach((href) => {
+          const result = options.renderer!.image({
+            href,
+            title: null,
+            text: 'L',
+          } as any);
+          expect(result).toContain(`src="${href}"`);
+        });
+      });
+
+      it('escapes the blocked-image alt text so it cannot inject markup', () => {
+        const result = options.renderer!.image({
+          href: 'file://host/share/x.png',
+          title: null,
+          text: '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>',
+        } as any);
+        expect(result).not.toContain('<img');
+        expect(result).toContain('&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;');
+      });
+    });
   });
 
   describe('paragraph renderer', () => {

src/app/ui/marked-options-factory.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 import { MarkedOptions, MarkedRenderer } from 'ngx-markdown';
 import { Hooks, Token } from 'marked';
+import {
+  isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed,
+  isPathSafeToOpen,
+} from '../../../electron/shared-with-frontend/is-external-url-allowed';
 
 /**
  * Escape a string for safe interpolation into a double-quoted HTML attribute.
  *
- * Defense-in-depth: the note render surfaces run this renderer's output through
- * Angular's SecurityContext.HTML sanitizer (they no longer set disableSanitizer),
- * which already strips event-handler attributes. Escaping here additionally keeps
- * the raw renderer output non-injectable on its own, so a future sanitizer bypass
- * can't turn an attacker-controlled image href/title/alt into a new attribute.
+ * Defense-in-depth: note renders are sanitized as HTML before display, but the
+ * raw renderer output still must not be attribute-injectable on its own.
  * `&` must be replaced first.
  */
 export const escapeHtmlAttr = (value: string): string =>
@@ -117,10 +118,12 @@ export const markedOptionsFactory = (): MarkedOptions => {
     tokens: Token[];
   }) {
     const text = tokens ? this.parser.parseInline(tokens) : '';
-    // Escape href/title for parity with renderer.image — the raw renderer output
-    // must not be attribute-injectable on its own (text is already-parsed inline
-    // HTML, so it is not re-escaped). rel="noopener noreferrer" matches the
-    // hardening in render-links.pipe.ts and avoids reverse-tabnabbing.
+    // Block unsafe URL schemes from rendering as clickable links. On click the
+    // href is passed verbatim to shell.openExternal (Electron), which would let
+    // note content silently invoke OS protocol handlers. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+    if (!isExternalUrlSchemeAllowed(href)) {
+      return `<span class="markdown-blocked-link" title="Link blocked: unsafe URL scheme">${text}</span>`;
+    }
     return `<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="${escapeHtmlAttr(href)}" title="${escapeHtmlAttr(title || '')}">${text}</a>`;
   };
 
@@ -136,6 +139,17 @@ export const markedOptionsFactory = (): MarkedOptions => {
     title: string | null;
     text: string;
   }) => {
+    // Unlike links, an image src auto-loads on render (no click). A remote
+    // `file://host/share` or UNC src would silently make the OS open an SMB
+    // connection and leak the user's NTLM hash just by viewing the note, so
+    // such srcs must never reach the `src` attribute. Remote web images
+    // (http/https/data/blob) are unaffected. See GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3.
+    if (!isPathSafeToOpen(href)) {
+      return `<span class="markdown-blocked-link" title="Image blocked: unsafe URL">${escapeHtmlAttr(
+        text || '',
+      )}</span>`;
+    }
+
     const { width, height } = parseImageDimensionsFromTitle(title);
 
     // Build width and height attributes (not style, as Angular sanitizer strips inline styles)

src/styles/components/markdown.scss

@@ -136,4 +136,16 @@
   .checkbox-label {
     cursor: pointer;
   }
+
+  // A markdown link with a disallowed URL scheme, or an image with an unsafe
+  // (remote file:// / UNC) src, renders as inert text instead of an anchor/img
+  // (security: GHSA-hr87-735w-hfq3, see marked-options-factory.ts). Style it as
+  // muted, non-interactive text with a help cursor so blocked content reads as
+  // intentionally disabled, not body copy (the title attribute explains why on
+  // hover).
+  .markdown-blocked-link {
+    color: var(--text-color-muted);
+    text-decoration: underline dotted;
+    cursor: help;
+  }
 }