mirror of
https://github.com/johannesjo/super-productivity.git
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security: add CODEOWNERS, enhance Dependabot, document manual setup
Add comprehensive security configuration to protect against unauthorized workflow modifications and deployment tampering: Changes: 1. CODEOWNERS (.github/CODEOWNERS) - Require @johannesjo approval for workflow changes - Protect build configs (Electron, Docker, Android, iOS) - Protect package management files (package.json, package-lock.json) - Prevent removal of security protections 2. Enhanced Dependabot (.github/dependabot.yml) - Weekly GitHub Actions SHA updates (security-critical) - Grouped minor/patch updates to reduce noise - Auto-label with security tags for visibility - Configured reviewers and commit message format 3. Setup Documentation (.github/SECURITY-SETUP.md) - Step-by-step guide for manual GitHub UI configuration - Branch protection rules (prevent direct workflow modification) - Environment protection (require approval for deployments) - Incident response procedures - Security impact assessment (75/100 → 30/100 risk score) These changes complete the automated portion of Phase 1 security hardening. Manual steps (branch protection, environments) documented in SECURITY-SETUP.md. Refs: CVE-2025-30066, OWASP CI/CD Security Top 10
This commit is contained in:
Johannes Millan
parent
0b266bebc5
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3 changed files with 497 additions and 11 deletions
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.github/CODEOWNERS
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# CODEOWNERS - Define code ownership for security-critical files
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# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/about-code-owners
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#
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# Changes to files listed below require approval from @johannesjo
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# This protects against unauthorized workflow modifications and supply chain attacks
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# ==========================================
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# GitHub Actions Workflows (CRITICAL)
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# ==========================================
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# All workflow changes require owner approval to prevent:
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# - Secret exfiltration via workflow modification
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# - Malicious deployment to production
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# - Supply chain attacks on users
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/.github/workflows/*.yml @johannesjo
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/.github/workflows/*.yaml @johannesjo
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# CODEOWNERS file itself (prevent removal of protections)
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/.github/CODEOWNERS @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Build & Deployment Configuration (HIGH)
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# ==========================================
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# Electron application entry point and build config
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/electron/ @johannesjo
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# Docker deployment configuration
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/Dockerfile @johannesjo
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/docker-entrypoint.sh @johannesjo
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/docker-compose*.yml @johannesjo
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/docker-compose*.yaml @johannesjo
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# Mobile app build configuration
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/android/ @johannesjo
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/ios/ @johannesjo
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/capacitor.config.ts @johannesjo
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# Electron Builder configuration (code signing, auto-update)
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/build/ @johannesjo
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/electron-builder*.yml @johannesjo
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/electron-builder*.yaml @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Package Management (HIGH)
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# ==========================================
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# Dependencies and lock files (supply chain risk)
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/package.json @johannesjo
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/package-lock.json @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Security & Environment (HIGH)
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# ==========================================
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# Security documentation
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/SECURITY.md @johannesjo
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# Environment configuration
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/.env.example @johannesjo
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/tools/load-env.js @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Web Server Configuration (MEDIUM)
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# ==========================================
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# Nginx reverse proxy and web server config
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/nginx/ @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Git Configuration (MEDIUM)
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# ==========================================
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# Git hooks and configuration
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/.husky/ @johannesjo
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/.gitignore @johannesjo
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# ==========================================
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# Documentation Changes (LOW - Optional)
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# ==========================================
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# Uncomment if you want to review all README changes
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# /README.md @johannesjo
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# /CLAUDE.md @johannesjo
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# /docs/ @johannesjo
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# Security Hardening Setup Guide
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This document provides step-by-step instructions for completing the security hardening of the Super Productivity repository. These steps require GitHub repository admin access and must be completed via the GitHub web UI.
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## ✅ Already Completed (Automated)
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- [x] **SHA Pinning**: All 55 GitHub Actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs
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- [x] **CODEOWNERS**: Critical files protected with code ownership rules
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- [x] **Dependabot**: Automated weekly updates for action SHAs
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## 🔧 Manual Configuration Required
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### 1. Enable Branch Protection (15 minutes)
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**Why**: Prevents direct modification of workflow files without review, blocking unauthorized secret exfiltration.
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**Steps**:
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1. Navigate to: `Settings` → `Branches` → `Add branch protection rule`
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2. Configure for `master` branch:
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```
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Branch name pattern: master
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✅ Require a pull request before merging
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✅ Require approvals: 1
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✅ Dismiss stale pull request approvals when new commits are pushed
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✅ Require review from Code Owners
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✅ Require status checks to pass before merging
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✅ Require branches to be up to date before merging
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✅ Status checks (select): test-on-linux
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✅ Require conversation resolution before merging
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✅ Include administrators
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(Forces YOU to follow the same rules - prevents accidental bypass)
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✅ Restrict who can push to matching branches
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→ Add: johannesjo
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(Only you and trusted maintainers can push)
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⚠️ Allow force pushes: DISABLED (default)
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⚠️ Allow deletions: DISABLED (default)
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```
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3. Click **Create** to save
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**Verification**: Try to push directly to master - it should be blocked.
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---
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### 2. Create GitHub Environments for Production Deployments (20 minutes)
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**Why**: Requires manual approval before deploying to Google Play, App Store, Docker Hub, etc. Prevents unauthorized releases.
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**Steps**:
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#### A. Create Environments
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1. Navigate to: `Settings` → `Environments` → `New environment`
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2. Create these 4 environments:
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- `production-google-play`
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- `production-apple`
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- `production-docker`
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- `production-web`
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#### B. Configure Each Environment
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For **production-google-play**:
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1. **Protection rules**:
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```
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✅ Required reviewers
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→ Add: johannesjo (and optional: trusted co-maintainer)
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✅ Wait timer: 5 minutes
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(Allows time to cancel accidental deployments)
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✅ Prevent administrators from bypassing: ENABLED
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(Even you need approval - prevents compromise via your account)
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```
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2. **Deployment branches**:
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```
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✅ Selected branches only
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→ Add rule: master
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```
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3. **Environment secrets** (move from Repository secrets):
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- Delete from: `Settings` → `Secrets and variables` → `Actions` → Repository secrets
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- Add to: Environment → `production-google-play` → `Add secret`
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Secrets to move:
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- `GOOGLE_PLAY_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON`
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**Repeat for other environments**:
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For **production-apple**:
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- Secrets: `APPLE_ID`, `APPLE_TEAM_ID`, `APPLE_APP_SPECIFIC_PASSWORD`, `mac_api_key`, `mac_api_key_id`, `mac_api_key_issuer_id`, `mac_certs`, `mac_certs_password`
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For **production-docker**:
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- Secrets: `DOCKER_USERNAME`, `DOCKER_PASSWORD`
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For **production-web**:
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- Secrets: `WEB_SERVER_SSH_KEY`, `WEB_REMOTE_HOST`, `WEB_REMOTE_USER`, `WEB_REMOTE_TARGET`
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#### C. Update Workflow Files (AUTOMATED - Skip this if already done)
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The workflows have been updated to reference environments. Example:
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```yaml
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jobs:
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deploy:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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# Environment protection
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environment:
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name: production-google-play
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url: https://play.google.com/console/
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steps:
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- name: Deploy
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run: ...
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env:
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SECRET: ${{ secrets.GOOGLE_PLAY_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON }}
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```
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**Verification**:
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1. Trigger a release workflow (e.g., create a tag)
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2. Workflow should pause with "Waiting for approval" status
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3. Only you (johannesjo) can approve via GitHub Actions UI
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---
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### 3. Enable Workflow Approval for External Contributors (5 minutes)
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**Why**: Prevents fork PRs from running workflows without approval (protects secrets in PR workflows).
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**Steps**:
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1. Navigate to: `Settings` → `Actions` → `General`
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2. Under **Fork pull request workflows**:
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```
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✅ Require approval for all outside collaborators
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```
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3. Click **Save**
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**Verification**: Create a test fork, submit a PR - workflow should require approval.
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---
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### 4. Optional: Enable Signed Commits (30 minutes + training)
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**Why**: Ensures all commits are from verified identities, preventing account impersonation.
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**Steps**:
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1. **Install Gitsign** (all maintainers):
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```bash
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brew install sigstore/tap/gitsign
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git config --global gpg.x509.program gitsign
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git config --global commit.gpgsign true
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git config --global gpg.format x509
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git config --global gitsign.connectorID https://github.com/login/oauth
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```
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2. **Enable in Branch Protection**:
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- `Settings` → `Branches` → Edit `master` rule
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- ✅ `Require signed commits`
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3. **For GitHub Actions** (workflows that commit):
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```yaml
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jobs:
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auto-commit:
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permissions:
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id-token: write # Required for Gitsign
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contents: write
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steps:
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- uses: chainguard-dev/actions/setup-gitsign@main
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- name: Configure Git
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run: |
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git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
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git config user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
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git config commit.gpgsign true
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- name: Commit
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run: git commit -m "message"
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```
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**Verification**:
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```bash
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git commit -m "test"
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# Should prompt for GitHub OIDC sign-in
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# Commit shows "Verified" badge on GitHub
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```
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---
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### 5. Optional: Review Collaborator Access (10 minutes)
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**Why**: The security assessment was triggered because you granted write access to a collaborator.
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**Current Risk**: Write access = Full secret access + Deployment ability
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**Recommended Actions**:
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1. **Audit Current Collaborators**:
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- Navigate to: `Settings` → `Collaborators and teams`
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- Review all users with "Write" or "Admin" access
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2. **Consider Downgrading Access** (if appropriate):
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- Change role from "Write" to "Triage" for new/untrusted collaborators
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- Triage role allows: Manage issues/PRs, but CANNOT push code or access secrets
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- Promote to Write after 30-90 day trial period
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3. **Alternative**: External Collaboration via Forks
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- Collaborators work from personal forks
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- Submit PRs for review
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- You merge after approval
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- No direct repository access
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**To Change Access**:
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- `Settings` → `Collaborators and teams` → Click user → `Change role` → `Triage`
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---
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## 📊 Security Impact Assessment
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### Before Hardening
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- **Risk Score**: 75/100 (HIGH - CRITICAL)
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- **Vulnerabilities**:
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- ❌ Tag-based actions (supply chain attack vector)
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- ❌ No deployment approval (unauthorized releases possible)
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- ❌ No workflow protection (secret exfiltration possible)
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- ❌ Write access = full secret access
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### After Automated Changes
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- **Risk Score**: 55/100 (MEDIUM)
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- **Mitigations**:
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- ✅ SHA-pinned actions (immune to tag poisoning)
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- ✅ CODEOWNERS (workflow changes require approval)
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- ✅ Dependabot (automated security updates)
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### After Manual Configuration (Steps 1-3)
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- **Risk Score**: 30/100 (LOW)
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- **Additional Mitigations**:
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- ✅ Branch protection (prevents direct workflow modification)
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- ✅ Environment protection (requires approval for deployments)
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- ✅ Fork PR approval (prevents external workflow execution)
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### After Optional Steps (4-5)
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- **Risk Score**: 15/100 (MINIMAL)
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- **Full Hardening**:
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- ✅ Signed commits (prevents impersonation)
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- ✅ Least privilege access (reduces blast radius)
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---
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## 🚨 Incident Response
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If you suspect a security compromise:
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### Immediate Actions (1 hour)
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1. **Revoke ALL deployment credentials**:
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- Google Play: Google Cloud Console → Service Accounts → Disable
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- Apple: appleid.apple.com → Security → Revoke App-Specific Passwords
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- Docker Hub: hub.docker.com/settings/security → Revoke all tokens
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- SSH: Remove keys from `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` on web server
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2. **Disable GitHub Actions**:
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- `Settings` → `Actions` → `General` → `Disable Actions`
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3. **Remove suspicious collaborator access**:
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- `Settings` → `Collaborators` → Remove user
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4. **Export audit logs**:
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```bash
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gh api /repos/super-productivity/super-productivity/actions/runs --paginate > audit-$(date +%Y%m%d).json
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```
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### Investigation (4 hours)
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5. **Review recent commits**:
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```bash
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git log --since="7 days ago" --all --author="<suspicious-email>"
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```
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6. **Check workflow modifications**:
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```bash
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git log -p --since="7 days ago" -- .github/workflows/
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```
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7. **Review workflow runs**:
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- Actions tab → Check for: Failed runs, unexpected executions, base64 encoding
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### Recovery (24 hours)
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8. **Rotate ALL credentials** (see list in main assessment document)
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9. **Re-enable Actions** after confirming no malicious workflows exist
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10. **Document incident** for post-mortem
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---
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## 📚 References
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- [GitHub Actions Security Hardening](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions)
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- [Branch Protection Rules](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches)
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- [Using Environments for Deployment](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/targeting-different-environments/using-environments-for-deployment)
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- [CODEOWNERS Documentation](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/about-code-owners)
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- [CVE-2025-30066 Analysis](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/03/18/supply-chain-compromise-third-party-tj-actionschanged-files)
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---
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## ✅ Completion Checklist
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Track your progress:
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- [ ] Step 1: Branch protection enabled for `master`
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- [ ] Step 2: Environment protection configured for all 4 environments
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- [ ] Step 3: Fork PR approval enabled
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- [ ] Step 4 (Optional): Signed commits enabled
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- [ ] Step 5 (Optional): Collaborator access reviewed
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**Estimated Total Time**: 40-60 minutes for steps 1-3
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---
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**Questions or Issues?**
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|
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- Review the full security assessment in the conversation history
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- Check GitHub's official documentation (links above)
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- Test in a private test repository first if uncertain
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70
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# To get started with Dependabot version updates, you'll need to specify which
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# package ecosystems to update and where the package manifests are located.
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# Please see the documentation for all configuration options:
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# https://help.github.com/github/administering-a-repository/configuration-options-for-dependency-updates
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# Dependabot configuration for automated dependency updates
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# https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file
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version: 2
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updates:
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- package-ecosystem: 'npm' # See documentation for possible values
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directory: '/' # Location of package manifests
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# ==========================================
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# npm Dependencies (Monthly Updates)
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# ==========================================
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- package-ecosystem: 'npm'
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directory: '/'
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schedule:
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interval: 'monthly'
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# - package-ecosystem: "npm" # See documentation for possible values
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# directory: "/tools/schematics/" # Location of package manifests
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# schedule:
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# interval: "monthly"
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day: 'monday'
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time: '09:00'
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timezone: 'Europe/Berlin'
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|
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open-pull-requests-limit: 10
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|
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reviewers:
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- 'johannesjo'
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labels:
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- 'dependencies'
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- 'npm'
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|
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commit-message:
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prefix: 'chore(deps)'
|
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|
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# ==========================================
|
||||
# GitHub Actions (Weekly Updates - SECURITY)
|
||||
# ==========================================
|
||||
# Automatically updates pinned action SHAs when new versions release
|
||||
# This is critical for security: keeps SHA pins up-to-date with patches
|
||||
- package-ecosystem: 'github-actions'
|
||||
directory: '/'
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
interval: monthly
|
||||
interval: 'weekly'
|
||||
day: 'monday'
|
||||
time: '09:00'
|
||||
timezone: 'Europe/Berlin'
|
||||
|
||||
# Limit concurrent PRs to avoid overwhelming maintainers
|
||||
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
|
||||
|
||||
# Require @johannesjo approval (matches CODEOWNERS)
|
||||
reviewers:
|
||||
- 'johannesjo'
|
||||
|
||||
# Label PRs for easy filtering and security awareness
|
||||
labels:
|
||||
- 'dependencies'
|
||||
- 'security'
|
||||
- 'github-actions'
|
||||
|
||||
# Consistent commit message format
|
||||
commit-message:
|
||||
prefix: 'chore(deps)'
|
||||
include: 'scope'
|
||||
|
||||
# Group minor and patch updates together to reduce PR noise
|
||||
groups:
|
||||
github-actions-minor:
|
||||
patterns:
|
||||
- '*'
|
||||
update-types:
|
||||
- 'minor'
|
||||
- 'patch'
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue