From 37a5101da3c4fbc3b2a85d528762f15fa796dc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Millan Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 17:50:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] docs(sync): remove separate review doc, architecture documented in code --- .../ai/sync/e2e-encryption-review-dec-2025.md | 354 ------------------ 1 file changed, 354 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/ai/sync/e2e-encryption-review-dec-2025.md diff --git a/docs/ai/sync/e2e-encryption-review-dec-2025.md b/docs/ai/sync/e2e-encryption-review-dec-2025.md deleted file mode 100644 index 99ec6b3ab..000000000 --- a/docs/ai/sync/e2e-encryption-review-dec-2025.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,354 +0,0 @@ -# E2E Encryption Implementation Review - December 2025 - -## Executive Summary - -This document provides a comprehensive security review of the E2E encryption implementation for SuperSync operation logs. - -**Overall Status**: ✅ **PRODUCTION READY** - E2E encryption is fully implemented for SuperSync - ---- - -## Architecture Context (IMPORTANT) - -Before analyzing the code paths, it's critical to understand the sync architecture: - -### How Operation Log Sync Works - -1. **Operation log sync only runs for providers that support it** (see `sync.service.ts:104`) -2. **Only SuperSync implements `OperationSyncCapable`** - it's the only provider with `supportsOperationSync = true` -3. **SuperSync always uses API-based sync** (`_uploadPendingOpsViaApi` / `_downloadRemoteOpsViaApi`) -4. **Legacy providers (WebDAV, Dropbox, LocalFile) skip operation log sync entirely** and use pfapi's model-level LWW sync with whole-file encryption via `EncryptAndCompressHandler` - -### Code Flow - -``` -sync.service.ts:sync() - │ - ├── if (_supportsOpLogSync(provider)) { // Only true for SuperSync - │ └── operationLogSyncService.uploadPendingOps() - │ └── if (isOperationSyncCapable) → _uploadPendingOpsViaApi() ✅ ENCRYPTED - │ └── else → _uploadPendingOpsViaFiles() ⚠️ NEVER CALLED - │ - └── else { // WebDAV, Dropbox, LocalFile - └── pfapi model sync (LWW with file-level encryption) -``` - -### File-based Operation Log Sync is DEAD CODE - -The methods `_uploadPendingOpsViaFiles()` and `_downloadRemoteOpsViaFiles()` exist for future extensibility but are **never called** because: - -1. SuperSync uses API-based sync (it implements `OperationSyncCapable`) -2. Legacy providers skip operation log sync entirely - -These methods have been documented with `CURRENTLY UNUSED` JSDoc comments. - ---- - -## Review Summary - -| Category | Status | Notes | -| ------------------------------ | ------- | ---------------------------------- | -| **Upload - API Path** | ✅ GOOD | Encryption implemented | -| **Upload - File-based Path** | ℹ️ N/A | Dead code - never called | -| **Upload - Snapshot Path** | ✅ GOOD | Encryption implemented | -| **Download - API Path** | ✅ GOOD | Decryption with error handling | -| **Download - Piggybacked Ops** | ✅ GOOD | Decryption implemented | -| **Download - File-based Path** | ℹ️ N/A | Dead code - never called | -| **Edge Cases** | ✅ GOOD | Mixed encryption handled correctly | -| **Configuration** | ✅ GOOD | Properly stored in private config | - ---- - -## 1. Upload Path Analysis - -### 1.1 Regular Operations via uploadOps (API-based) ✅ - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-upload.service.ts` - -**Lines 119-182**: Encryption is properly implemented: - -```typescript -// Check if E2E encryption is enabled -const privateCfg = (await syncProvider.privateCfg.load()) as SuperSyncPrivateCfg | null; -const isEncryptionEnabled = privateCfg?.isEncryptionEnabled && !!privateCfg?.encryptKey; -const encryptKey = privateCfg?.encryptKey; - -// Encrypt payloads if E2E encryption is enabled -if (isEncryptionEnabled && encryptKey) { - OpLog.normal('OperationLogUploadService: Encrypting operation payloads...'); - syncOps = await this.encryptionService.encryptOperations(syncOps, encryptKey); -} -``` - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Operations are encrypted before upload when encryption is enabled. - ---- - -### 1.2 Full-State Operations via Snapshot Endpoint ✅ - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-upload.service.ts` - -**Lines 383-419**: Snapshot encryption is properly implemented: - -```typescript -private async _uploadFullStateOpAsSnapshot( - syncProvider: SyncProviderServiceInterface & OperationSyncCapable, - entry: OperationLogEntry, - encryptKey: string | undefined, -): Promise<{ accepted: boolean; serverSeq?: number; error?: string }> { - let state = op.payload; - - // If encryption is enabled, encrypt the state - if (encryptKey) { - OpLog.normal('OperationLogUploadService: Encrypting snapshot payload...'); - state = await this.encryptionService.encryptPayload(state, encryptKey); - } - // ... upload encrypted state ... -} -``` - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Full-state snapshots are encrypted before upload. - ---- - -### 1.3 File-based Sync Upload Path ℹ️ **NOT APPLICABLE** - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-upload.service.ts` - -**Lines 270-346**: `_uploadPendingOpsViaFiles()` method - -**Status**: ℹ️ **DEAD CODE** - This method is never called because: - -- Only SuperSync supports operation log sync -- SuperSync uses API-based sync, not file-based sync -- Legacy providers skip operation log sync entirely - -The method has been documented with a `CURRENTLY UNUSED` JSDoc comment explaining this. - ---- - -## 2. Download Path Analysis - -### 2.1 Regular Downloaded Operations (API-based) ✅ - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-download.service.ts` - -**Lines 145-178**: Decryption is properly implemented with error handling: - -```typescript -// Decrypt encrypted operations if we have an encryption key -const hasEncryptedOps = syncOps.some((op) => op.isPayloadEncrypted); -if (hasEncryptedOps) { - if (!encryptKey) { - OpLog.error('Received encrypted operations but no encryption key configured.'); - this.snackService.open({ - type: 'ERROR', - msg: T.F.SYNC.S.ENCRYPTION_PASSWORD_REQUIRED, - }); - downloadFailed = true; - return; - } - - try { - syncOps = await this.encryptionService.decryptOperations(syncOps, encryptKey); - } catch (e) { - if (e instanceof DecryptError) { - OpLog.error('Failed to decrypt operations. Wrong encryption password?', e); - this.snackService.open({ type: 'ERROR', msg: T.F.SYNC.S.DECRYPTION_FAILED }); - downloadFailed = true; - return; - } - throw e; - } -} -``` - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Downloaded operations are properly decrypted with error handling for: - -- Missing encryption key -- Wrong password -- Corrupted ciphertext - ---- - -### 2.2 Piggybacked Operations ✅ - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-upload.service.ts` - -**Lines 227-234**: Piggybacked operations from upload response are properly decrypted: - -```typescript -// Decrypt piggybacked ops if any are encrypted and we have a key -const hasEncryptedOps = piggybackSyncOps.some((op) => op.isPayloadEncrypted); -if (hasEncryptedOps && encryptKey) { - piggybackSyncOps = await this.encryptionService.decryptOperations( - piggybackSyncOps, - encryptKey, - ); -} -``` - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Piggybacked operations are decrypted when needed. - ---- - -### 2.3 File-based Sync Download Path ℹ️ **NOT APPLICABLE** - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-log-download.service.ts` - -**Lines 237-331**: `_downloadRemoteOpsViaFiles()` method - -**Status**: ℹ️ **DEAD CODE** - Same as upload path, this method is never called. - -The method has been documented with a `CURRENTLY UNUSED` JSDoc comment explaining this. - ---- - -## 3. Edge Cases Analysis - -### 3.1 Mixed Encrypted/Unencrypted History ✅ - -**Scenario**: Some operations are encrypted, others are not (common after enabling encryption mid-use). - -**Current Behavior**: - -- `decryptOperation()` checks `isPayloadEncrypted` flag and passes through unencrypted ops unchanged -- Tested in `operation-encryption.service.spec.ts` (lines 74-83, 152-167) - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Correctly handles mixed encryption states. - ---- - -### 3.2 Wrong Password ✅ - -**Scenario**: User provides wrong encryption password. - -**Current Behavior**: Properly handled in download path: - -- Catches `DecryptError` -- Shows user-friendly error message -- Fails sync gracefully without corrupting data - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Error handling is correct. - ---- - -### 3.3 Missing Password with Encrypted Operations ✅ - -**Scenario**: User's encryption key is missing but remote operations are encrypted. - -**Current Behavior**: Properly handled in download path: - -- Detects encrypted ops without key -- Shows error message requesting password -- Fails sync without attempting to apply encrypted data - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Error handling is correct. - ---- - -## 4. Configuration Analysis - -### 4.1 Encryption Key Storage ✅ - -The encryption key is stored in the **private config** (not synced): - -- `SuperSyncPrivateCfg.encryptKey` - The actual key -- `SuperSyncPrivateCfg.isEncryptionEnabled` - Flag to enable/disable - -**Status**: ✅ **PASS** - Encryption key is properly stored and never synced. - ---- - -## 5. Test Coverage - -### 5.1 Unit Tests ✅ - -**File**: `src/app/core/persistence/operation-log/sync/operation-encryption.service.spec.ts` - -**Coverage**: - -- ✅ Encryption with `isPayloadEncrypted` flag -- ✅ Decryption of encrypted ops -- ✅ Pass-through of unencrypted ops -- ✅ Wrong password error handling -- ✅ Corrupted ciphertext error handling -- ✅ Mixed encrypted/unencrypted batches -- ✅ Various payload types (null, string, number, array, nested objects) -- ✅ Special characters and unicode - -**Status**: ✅ **EXCELLENT** - Comprehensive unit test coverage. - ---- - -### 5.2 E2E Tests ✅ - -**File**: `e2e/tests/sync/supersync-encryption.spec.ts` - -**Coverage**: - -- ✅ "Encrypted data syncs correctly with valid password" -- ✅ "Encrypted data fails to sync with wrong password" - -**Status**: ✅ **GOOD** - Both positive and negative scenarios tested. - ---- - -## 6. Fixes Applied - -The following issues were fixed during this review: - -### 6.1 Zod Schema Missing `isPayloadEncrypted` Field 🔴 → ✅ - -**Location**: `packages/super-sync-server/src/sync/sync.routes.ts` - -**Issue**: The Zod `OperationSchema` was missing the `isPayloadEncrypted` field. Since Zod strips unknown keys by default, the client was sending `isPayloadEncrypted: true` but the server was receiving `undefined`. - -**Fix**: Added `isPayloadEncrypted: z.boolean().optional()` to the schema. - -### 6.2 Debug Logging Removed ✅ - -Removed debug `console.log` statements from: - -- `operation-log-upload.service.ts` -- `operation-encryption.service.ts` -- `sync.service.ts` (server) - -### 6.3 Potential Key Exposure Removed ✅ - -**Location**: `encrypt-and-compress-handler.service.ts` - -- Removed `encryptKey` from `DecryptNoPasswordError` additional data -- Removed log that could expose encrypt key in dev mode - -### 6.4 Duplicate Form Fields Fixed ✅ - -**Location**: `sync-form.const.ts` - -**Issue**: Two sets of encryption fields were shown - SuperSync-specific and generic "Advanced" fields. - -**Fix**: Added `hideExpression` to hide Advanced encryption fields when SuperSync is selected. - ---- - -## 7. Conclusion - -The E2E encryption implementation for SuperSync is **complete and production-ready**: - -✅ Operations encrypted before upload (API path) -✅ Operations decrypted after download (API path) -✅ Piggybacked operations decrypted -✅ Snapshot uploads encrypted -✅ Mixed encryption states handled correctly -✅ Wrong password detection with user-friendly error -✅ Missing password detection with user-friendly error -✅ Encryption key stored securely in private config -✅ Both E2E tests passing -✅ All 29 SuperSync tests passing - -The file-based operation log sync paths (`_uploadPendingOpsViaFiles`, `_downloadRemoteOpsViaFiles`) are dead code that exists for future extensibility but is never called in the current architecture. - ---- - -**Review Date**: December 12, 2025 -**Status**: ✅ **PRODUCTION READY**