CHANGELOG: drop unreleased 0.30.0 stub

Release-branch only; the stub tracks unreleased main work.

.github/workflows/test-integration.yaml

@@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ jobs:
           - TestTagsAuthKeyWithoutUserInheritsTags
           - TestTagsAuthKeyWithoutUserRejectsAdvertisedTags
           - TestTagsAuthKeyConvertToUserViaCLIRegister
+          - TestTS2021WebSocketGET
+          - TestTS2021WASMClientUnderNode
           - TestTailscaleRustAxum
     uses: ./.github/workflows/integration-test-template.yml
     secrets: inherit

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,8 +1,22 @@
 # CHANGELOG
 
-## 0.30.0 (202x-xx-xx)
+## 0.29.2 (2026-07-01)
 
-**Minimum supported Tailscale client version: v1.xx.0**
+**Minimum supported Tailscale client version: v1.80.0**
+
+### Changes
+
+- Fix map generation serializing on the policy lock, so a mass reconnect on `autogroup:self`, via or relay policies no longer stalls clients into `unexpected EOF` retry loops [#3358](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/3358)
+- Fix `/ts2021` rejecting the WebSocket `GET` upgrade with 405, which prevented Tailscale JS/WASM control clients from connecting [#3359](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/3359)
+- Gracefully handle nodes with an invalid FQDN (empty or too long) instead of failing map delivery; offending names are logged at startup with the fix command [#3349](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/3349)
+
+## 0.29.1 (2026-06-18)
+
+**Minimum supported Tailscale client version: v1.80.0**
+
+### Changes
+
+- Fix nodes with `tags='null'` losing their assigned user on upgrade [#3325](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/3325)
 
 ## 0.29.0 (2026-06-17)
 

Dockerfile.wasmclient

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# For integration testing only.
+#
+# Builds the Tailscale control client (integration/wasmic/wasmclient) for
+# GOOS=js/GOARCH=wasm and packages it with Go's wasm_exec Node runner. The
+# container idles; the integration test execs
+#   node /app/wasm_exec_node.js /app/client.wasm <control-url>
+# to drive a real browser-style WebSocket GET against headscale's /ts2021,
+# guarding the regression in issue #3357.
+
+FROM golang:1.26.4-alpine AS build
+
+WORKDIR /src
+
+# Only the module metadata and the wasm client package are needed to build the
+# js/wasm binary; its imports (tailscale.com/control/controlhttp, ...) resolve
+# from the module proxy.
+COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+COPY integration/wasmic/wasmclient ./integration/wasmic/wasmclient
+
+RUN GOOS=js GOARCH=wasm go build -o /out/client.wasm ./integration/wasmic/wasmclient \
+    && cp "$(go env GOROOT)/lib/wasm/wasm_exec.js" /out/wasm_exec.js \
+    && cp "$(go env GOROOT)/lib/wasm/wasm_exec_node.js" /out/wasm_exec_node.js
+
+FROM node:24-alpine
+
+WORKDIR /app
+COPY --from=build /out/ /app/
+
+# Idle; the test execs the client on demand with the headscale control URL.
+ENTRYPOINT ["tail", "-f", "/dev/null"]

docs/ref/policy.md

@@ -158,17 +158,17 @@ devices. Can only be used in policy destinations.
         {
           "src": ["boss@"],
           "dst": ["boss@"],
-          "ip": "*"
+          "ip": ["*"]
         },
         {
           "src": ["dev1@"],
           "dst": ["dev1@"],
-          "ip": "*"
+          "ip": ["*"]
         },
         {
           "src": ["intern1@"],
           "dst": ["intern1@"],
-          "ip": "*"
+          "ip": ["*"]
         }
       ]
     }

hscontrol/app.go

@@ -544,6 +544,11 @@ func (h *Headscale) createRouter(grpcMux *grpcRuntime.ServeMux) *chi.Mux {
 	r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
 	r.Use(securityHeaders)
 
+	// TS2021 accepts both the native client's HTTP POST upgrade and the
+	// browser/WASM client's WebSocket GET upgrade; NoiseUpgradeHandler
+	// dispatches on the Upgrade header, not the method. Registering GET as
+	// well keeps the router from rejecting the WebSocket handshake with 405.
+	r.Get(ts2021UpgradePath, h.NoiseUpgradeHandler)
 	r.Post(ts2021UpgradePath, h.NoiseUpgradeHandler)
 
 	r.Get("/robots.txt", h.RobotsHandler)

hscontrol/db/db.go

@@ -706,13 +706,20 @@ AND auth_key_id NOT IN (
 				// but this prevents deleting users whose nodes have been
 				// tagged, and the ON DELETE CASCADE FK would destroy the
 				// tagged nodes if the user were deleted.
+				//
+				// A nil tags slice marshals to the JSON literal 'null', so
+				// untagged nodes can carry tags='null'. That spelling must be
+				// excluded alongside '[]' and '' or untagged nodes lose their
+				// user. Nodes already detached by the earlier version of this
+				// migration are repaired by the recovery migration below.
 				// Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3077
+				// Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
 				ID: "202602201200-clear-tagged-node-user-id",
 				Migrate: func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
 					err := tx.Exec(`
 UPDATE nodes
 SET user_id = NULL
-WHERE tags IS NOT NULL AND tags != '[]' AND tags != '';
+WHERE tags IS NOT NULL AND tags != '[]' AND tags != '' AND tags != 'null';
 						`).Error
 					if err != nil {
 						return fmt.Errorf("clearing user_id on tagged nodes: %w", err)
@@ -744,6 +751,36 @@ WHERE expiry IS NOT NULL AND expiry < '1900-01-01';
 				},
 				Rollback: func(db *gorm.DB) error { return nil },
 			},
+			{
+				// Recover user_id on untagged nodes detached by the earlier
+				// version of 202602201200-clear-tagged-node-user-id, which
+				// treated tags='null' as tagged and cleared the user. This
+				// repairs databases that already upgraded to 0.29.0; fresh
+				// upgrades are protected by the fixed migration above and find
+				// nothing to repair. Recovery is best-effort: the owner is
+				// re-derived from the node's pre-auth key, so nodes registered
+				// via CLI/OIDC (no pre-auth key) cannot be recovered and must
+				// be reassigned manually.
+				// Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
+				ID: "202606181200-recover-null-tags-node-user-id",
+				Migrate: func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+					err := tx.Exec(`
+UPDATE nodes
+SET user_id = (
+	SELECT pak.user_id FROM pre_auth_keys pak WHERE pak.id = nodes.auth_key_id
+)
+WHERE user_id IS NULL
+	AND auth_key_id IS NOT NULL
+	AND (tags IS NULL OR tags = '' OR tags = '[]' OR tags = 'null');
+						`).Error
+					if err != nil {
+						return fmt.Errorf("recovering user_id on untagged nodes: %w", err)
+					}
+
+					return nil
+				},
+				Rollback: func(db *gorm.DB) error { return nil },
+			},
 		},
 	)
 

hscontrol/db/db_test.go

@@ -198,6 +198,103 @@ func TestSQLiteMigrationAndDataValidation(t *testing.T) {
 				assert.False(t, node5.IsExpired(), "node5 should not be reported as expired")
 			},
 		},
+		// Test for the clear-tagged-node-user-id migration
+		// (202602201200-clear-tagged-node-user-id). A nil tags slice
+		// marshals to the JSON literal 'null', so untagged nodes can carry
+		// tags='null' in the database. The migration must only clear
+		// user_id on genuinely tagged nodes, not on these untagged ones.
+		// Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
+		{
+			dbPath: "testdata/sqlite/null_tags_user_id_migration_test.sql",
+			wantFunc: func(t *testing.T, hsdb *HSDatabase) {
+				t.Helper()
+
+				nodes, err := Read(hsdb.DB, func(rx *gorm.DB) (types.Nodes, error) {
+					return ListNodes(rx)
+				})
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				require.Len(t, nodes, 4, "should have all 4 nodes")
+
+				byHostname := make(map[string]*types.Node, len(nodes))
+				for _, n := range nodes {
+					byHostname[n.Hostname] = n
+				}
+
+				// Node 1 had tags='null' (untagged) and belonged to user2.
+				// The migration must NOT clear its user_id.
+				node1 := byHostname["node1"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node1, "node1 should exist")
+				assert.False(t, node1.IsTagged(), "node1 with tags='null' should be untagged")
+				require.NotNil(t, node1.UserID, "node1 should keep its user assigned")
+				assert.Equal(t, uint(2), *node1.UserID, "node1 should still belong to user2")
+
+				// Node 2 is genuinely tagged; user_id must be cleared.
+				node2 := byHostname["node2"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node2, "node2 should exist")
+				assert.True(t, node2.IsTagged(), "node2 should be tagged")
+				assert.Nil(t, node2.UserID, "node2 (tagged) should have user_id cleared")
+
+				// Node 3 had tags='[]' (untagged); user_id preserved.
+				node3 := byHostname["node3"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node3, "node3 should exist")
+				assert.False(t, node3.IsTagged(), "node3 with tags='[]' should be untagged")
+				require.NotNil(t, node3.UserID, "node3 should keep its user assigned")
+				assert.Equal(t, uint(1), *node3.UserID, "node3 should still belong to user1")
+
+				// Node 4 had tags='' (untagged); user_id preserved.
+				node4 := byHostname["node4"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node4, "node4 should exist")
+				assert.False(t, node4.IsTagged(), "node4 with tags='' should be untagged")
+				require.NotNil(t, node4.UserID, "node4 should keep its user assigned")
+				assert.Equal(t, uint(1), *node4.UserID, "node4 should still belong to user1")
+			},
+		},
+		// Test for the null-tags user_id recovery migration. Databases that
+		// already upgraded to 0.29.0 had user_id wrongly cleared on untagged
+		// nodes with tags='null'. The recovery migration re-derives user_id
+		// from the node's pre-auth key where one exists.
+		// Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
+		{
+			dbPath: "testdata/sqlite/recover_null_tags_user_id_migration_test.sql",
+			wantFunc: func(t *testing.T, hsdb *HSDatabase) {
+				t.Helper()
+
+				nodes, err := Read(hsdb.DB, func(rx *gorm.DB) (types.Nodes, error) {
+					return ListNodes(rx)
+				})
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				require.Len(t, nodes, 4, "should have all 4 nodes")
+
+				byHostname := make(map[string]*types.Node, len(nodes))
+				for _, n := range nodes {
+					byHostname[n.Hostname] = n
+				}
+
+				// Node 1: authkey-registered, orphaned by the bug. The recovery
+				// migration restores user_id from its pre-auth key (user2).
+				node1 := byHostname["node1"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node1, "node1 should exist")
+				require.NotNil(t, node1.UserID, "node1 user_id should be recovered")
+				assert.Equal(t, uint(2), *node1.UserID, "node1 should be recovered to user2")
+
+				// Node 2: genuinely tagged, correctly cleared. Must stay cleared.
+				node2 := byHostname["node2"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node2, "node2 should exist")
+				assert.True(t, node2.IsTagged(), "node2 should be tagged")
+				assert.Nil(t, node2.UserID, "node2 (tagged) must remain cleared")
+
+				// Node 3: CLI-registered, no pre-auth key. Unrecoverable.
+				node3 := byHostname["node3"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node3, "node3 should exist")
+				assert.Nil(t, node3.UserID, "node3 has no pre-auth key to recover from")
+
+				// Node 4: never orphaned; user_id must be untouched.
+				node4 := byHostname["node4"]
+				require.NotNil(t, node4, "node4 should exist")
+				require.NotNil(t, node4.UserID, "node4 user_id should be untouched")
+				assert.Equal(t, uint(1), *node4.UserID, "node4 should still belong to user1")
+			},
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {

hscontrol/db/testdata/sqlite/null_tags_user_id_migration_test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+-- Test SQL dump for the clear-tagged-node-user-id migration
+-- (202602201200-clear-tagged-node-user-id) against nodes whose tags
+-- column holds the JSON literal 'null'.
+--
+-- A nil Strings slice marshals to the JSON literal `null`, so pre-0.29
+-- databases contain untagged nodes with tags='null'. The migration's
+-- WHERE clause (tags IS NOT NULL AND tags != '[]' AND tags != '') treats
+-- the 4-character string 'null' as "tagged" and wrongly clears user_id,
+-- detaching the node from its owning user on upgrade.
+-- Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
+
+PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
+BEGIN TRANSACTION;
+
+-- Migrations table: every entry BEFORE clear-tagged-node-user-id has been
+-- applied. That migration is intentionally absent so it runs against this dump.
+CREATE TABLE `migrations` (`id` text,PRIMARY KEY (`id`));
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202312101416');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202312101430');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202402151347');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('2024041121742');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202406021630');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202409271400');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202407191627');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202408181235');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202501221827');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202501311657');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502070949');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502131714');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502171819');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202505091439');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202505141324');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202507021200');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202510311551');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511101554-drop-old-idx');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511011637-preauthkey-bcrypt');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511122344-remove-newline-index');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511131445-node-forced-tags-to-tags');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202601121700-migrate-hostinfo-request-tags');
+
+-- Users table
+CREATE TABLE `users` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,`name` text,`display_name` text,`email` text,`provider_identifier` text,`provider` text,`profile_pic_url` text);
+INSERT INTO users VALUES(1,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'user1','User One','user1@example.com',NULL,NULL,NULL);
+INSERT INTO users VALUES(2,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'user2','User Two','user2@example.com',NULL,NULL,NULL);
+
+-- Pre-auth keys table
+CREATE TABLE `pre_auth_keys` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`key` text,`user_id` integer,`reusable` numeric,`ephemeral` numeric DEFAULT false,`used` numeric DEFAULT false,`tags` text,`created_at` datetime,`expiration` datetime,`prefix` text,`hash` blob,CONSTRAINT `fk_pre_auth_keys_user` FOREIGN KEY (`user_id`) REFERENCES `users`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL);
+
+-- API keys table
+CREATE TABLE `api_keys` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`prefix` text,`hash` blob,`created_at` datetime,`expiration` datetime,`last_seen` datetime);
+
+-- Nodes table - current schema (after the tags rename + last_seen/expiry reordering)
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "nodes" (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`machine_key` text,`node_key` text,`disco_key` text,`endpoints` text,`host_info` text,`ipv4` text,`ipv6` text,`hostname` text,`given_name` varchar(63),`user_id` integer,`register_method` text,`tags` text,`auth_key_id` integer,`last_seen` datetime,`expiry` datetime,`approved_routes` text,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,CONSTRAINT `fk_nodes_user` FOREIGN KEY (`user_id`) REFERENCES `users`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE,CONSTRAINT `fk_nodes_auth_key` FOREIGN KEY (`auth_key_id`) REFERENCES `pre_auth_keys`(`id`));
+
+-- Node 1: tags='null' (untagged, nil slice marshalled to JSON null), owned by user2.
+-- After migration: user_id MUST be preserved (this is the bug).
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(1,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e01','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605501','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57701','[]','{}','100.64.0.1','fd7a:115c:a1e0::1','node1','node1',2,'cli','null',NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 2: genuinely tagged, owned by user1.
+-- After migration: user_id MUST be cleared to NULL (tagged nodes are owned by tags).
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(2,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e02','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605502','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57702','[]','{}','100.64.0.2','fd7a:115c:a1e0::2','node2','node2',1,'cli','["tag:server"]',NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 3: empty-array tags (untagged), owned by user1.
+-- After migration: user_id MUST be preserved.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(3,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e03','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605503','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57703','[]','{}','100.64.0.3','fd7a:115c:a1e0::3','node3','node3',1,'cli','[]',NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 4: empty-string tags (untagged), owned by user1.
+-- After migration: user_id MUST be preserved.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(4,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e04','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605504','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57704','[]','{}','100.64.0.4','fd7a:115c:a1e0::4','node4','node4',1,'cli','',NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Policies table (empty)
+CREATE TABLE `policies` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,`data` text);
+
+DELETE FROM sqlite_sequence;
+INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence VALUES('users',2);
+INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence VALUES('nodes',4);
+CREATE INDEX idx_users_deleted_at ON users(deleted_at);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_api_keys_prefix ON api_keys(prefix);
+CREATE INDEX idx_policies_deleted_at ON policies(deleted_at);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_provider_identifier ON users(provider_identifier) WHERE provider_identifier IS NOT NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_name_provider_identifier ON users(name, provider_identifier);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_name_no_provider_identifier ON users(name) WHERE provider_identifier IS NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_pre_auth_keys_prefix ON pre_auth_keys(prefix) WHERE prefix IS NOT NULL AND prefix != '';
+
+COMMIT;

hscontrol/db/testdata/sqlite/recover_null_tags_user_id_migration_test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+-- Test SQL dump for the null-tags user_id RECOVERY migration.
+--
+-- Represents a database that already upgraded to 0.29.0, where the buggy
+-- clear-tagged-node-user-id migration (202602201200) already cleared
+-- user_id on untagged nodes whose tags column held 'null'. The recovery
+-- migration runs against this state and re-derives user_id from the node's
+-- pre-auth key where possible.
+-- Fixes: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3323
+
+PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
+BEGIN TRANSACTION;
+
+-- Migrations table: everything through the current last migration has been
+-- applied (this DB already ran the buggy clear-tagged migration). The new
+-- recovery migration is intentionally absent so it runs against this dump.
+CREATE TABLE `migrations` (`id` text,PRIMARY KEY (`id`));
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202312101416');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202312101430');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202402151347');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('2024041121742');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202406021630');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202409271400');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202407191627');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202408181235');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202501221827');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202501311657');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502070949');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502131714');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202502171819');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202505091439');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202505141324');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202507021200');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202510311551');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511101554-drop-old-idx');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511011637-preauthkey-bcrypt');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511122344-remove-newline-index');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202511131445-node-forced-tags-to-tags');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202601121700-migrate-hostinfo-request-tags');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202602201200-clear-tagged-node-user-id');
+INSERT INTO migrations VALUES('202605221435-clear-zero-time-node-expiry');
+
+-- Users table
+CREATE TABLE `users` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,`name` text,`display_name` text,`email` text,`provider_identifier` text,`provider` text,`profile_pic_url` text);
+INSERT INTO users VALUES(1,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'user1','User One','user1@example.com',NULL,NULL,NULL);
+INSERT INTO users VALUES(2,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'user2','User Two','user2@example.com',NULL,NULL,NULL);
+
+-- Pre-auth keys table. Key 1 belongs to user2, key 2 to user1.
+CREATE TABLE `pre_auth_keys` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`key` text,`user_id` integer,`reusable` numeric,`ephemeral` numeric DEFAULT false,`used` numeric DEFAULT false,`tags` text,`created_at` datetime,`expiration` datetime,`prefix` text,`hash` blob,CONSTRAINT `fk_pre_auth_keys_user` FOREIGN KEY (`user_id`) REFERENCES `users`(`id`) ON DELETE SET NULL);
+INSERT INTO pre_auth_keys VALUES(1,NULL,2,1,false,true,NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'pak1',NULL);
+INSERT INTO pre_auth_keys VALUES(2,NULL,1,1,false,true,NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'pak2',NULL);
+
+-- API keys table
+CREATE TABLE `api_keys` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`prefix` text,`hash` blob,`created_at` datetime,`expiration` datetime,`last_seen` datetime);
+
+-- Nodes table
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "nodes" (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`machine_key` text,`node_key` text,`disco_key` text,`endpoints` text,`host_info` text,`ipv4` text,`ipv6` text,`hostname` text,`given_name` varchar(63),`user_id` integer,`register_method` text,`tags` text,`auth_key_id` integer,`last_seen` datetime,`expiry` datetime,`approved_routes` text,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,CONSTRAINT `fk_nodes_user` FOREIGN KEY (`user_id`) REFERENCES `users`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE,CONSTRAINT `fk_nodes_auth_key` FOREIGN KEY (`auth_key_id`) REFERENCES `pre_auth_keys`(`id`));
+
+-- Node 1: authkey-registered, tags='null', already orphaned (user_id NULL) by
+-- the buggy migration. auth_key_id=1 (user2). Recovery: user_id -> 2.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(1,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e01','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605501','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57701','[]','{}','100.64.0.1','fd7a:115c:a1e0::1','node1','node1',NULL,'authkey','null',1,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 2: genuinely tagged, user_id correctly cleared. Must stay NULL.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(2,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e02','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605502','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57702','[]','{}','100.64.0.2','fd7a:115c:a1e0::2','node2','node2',NULL,'authkey','["tag:server"]',2,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 3: CLI-registered, tags='null', orphaned, no auth_key_id.
+-- Unrecoverable: must stay NULL.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(3,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e03','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605503','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57703','[]','{}','100.64.0.3','fd7a:115c:a1e0::3','node3','node3',NULL,'cli','null',NULL,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Node 4: authkey-registered, untouched (user_id still set). Must stay user1.
+INSERT INTO nodes VALUES(4,'mkey:a0ab77456320823945ae0331823e3c0d516fae9585bd42698dfa1ac3d7679e04','nodekey:7c84167ab68f494942de14deb83587fd841843de2bac105b6c670048c1605504','discokey:53075b3c6cad3b62a2a29caea61beeb93f66b8c75cb89dac465236a5bbf57704','[]','{}','100.64.0.4','fd7a:115c:a1e0::4','node4','node4',1,'authkey','null',2,'2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL,'[]','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00','2024-01-01 00:00:00+00:00',NULL);
+
+-- Policies table (empty)
+CREATE TABLE `policies` (`id` integer PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,`created_at` datetime,`updated_at` datetime,`deleted_at` datetime,`data` text);
+
+DELETE FROM sqlite_sequence;
+INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence VALUES('users',2);
+INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence VALUES('pre_auth_keys',2);
+INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence VALUES('nodes',4);
+CREATE INDEX idx_users_deleted_at ON users(deleted_at);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_api_keys_prefix ON api_keys(prefix);
+CREATE INDEX idx_policies_deleted_at ON policies(deleted_at);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_provider_identifier ON users(provider_identifier) WHERE provider_identifier IS NOT NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_name_provider_identifier ON users(name, provider_identifier);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_name_no_provider_identifier ON users(name) WHERE provider_identifier IS NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_pre_auth_keys_prefix ON pre_auth_keys(prefix) WHERE prefix IS NOT NULL AND prefix != '';
+
+COMMIT;

hscontrol/mapper/builder.go

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy"
 	policyv2 "github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy/v2"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/util/zlog/zf"
+	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
 	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
 	"tailscale.com/types/views"
 	"tailscale.com/util/multierr"
@@ -144,7 +146,15 @@ func (b *MapResponseBuilder) WithSSHPolicy() *MapResponseBuilder {
 
 	sshPolicy, err := b.mapper.state.SSHPolicy(node)
 	if err != nil {
-		b.addError(err)
+		// SSH policy is optional for a node to function. Rather than fail the
+		// whole map (leaving the node unable to connect), log and continue
+		// without it; the node still receives a usable netmap.
+		log.Warn().Caller().
+			Err(err).
+			Uint64(zf.NodeID, node.ID().Uint64()).
+			Str(zf.NodeHostname, node.Hostname()).
+			Msg("building map response: skipping SSH policy for node; node will receive a map without SSH rules")
+
 		return b
 	}
 
@@ -279,7 +289,19 @@ func (b *MapResponseBuilder) buildTailPeers(peers views.Slice[types.NodeView]) (
 			return b.mapper.state.RoutesForPeer(node, peer, matchers)
 		}, b.mapper.cfg, allCapMaps[peer.ID()])
 		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+			// One peer with invalid data (e.g. an empty or over-long
+			// GivenName that fails GetFQDN) must not blank out the map for
+			// every node that can see it. Drop the offending peer, log it
+			// with the identity an operator needs to fix it, and keep
+			// building from the remaining valid peers.
+			log.Warn().Caller().
+				Err(err).
+				Uint64(zf.NodeID, peer.ID().Uint64()).
+				Str(zf.NodeHostname, peer.Hostname()).
+				Uint64("map.viewer.node.id", b.nodeID.Uint64()).
+				Msgf("dropping peer %d from map response: invalid node data; fix with `headscale nodes rename %d <name>`", peer.ID(), peer.ID())
+
+			continue
 		}
 
 		// [tailcfg.Node.CapMap] on a peer carries the small set of

hscontrol/mapper/initialmap_storm_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+//go:build !race
+
+// This is a timing-sensitive performance regression test; the race detector's
+// ~10x slowdown makes its wall-clock assertion meaningless, so it is excluded
+// from -race builds. The concurrency correctness of the policy lock change it
+// guards is covered under -race by TestPolicyManagerConcurrentReads in
+// hscontrol/policy/v2.
+
+package mapper
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"runtime"
+	"slices"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/db"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/derp"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/state"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
+)
+
+// setupStormBatcher builds a real state+batcher with production-default
+// NodeStore batching so the reconnect-storm contention is realistic. It mirrors
+// setupBatcherWithTestData but lets the test control BatcherWorkers and the
+// policy.
+func setupStormBatcher(tb testing.TB, nodeCount, workers int, policy string) (*TestData, func()) {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	tmpDir := tb.TempDir()
+	prefixV4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
+	prefixV6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
+
+	cfg := &types.Config{
+		Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
+			Type:   types.DatabaseSqlite,
+			Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmpDir + "/headscale_test.db"},
+		},
+		PrefixV4:     &prefixV4,
+		PrefixV6:     &prefixV6,
+		IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
+		BaseDomain:   "headscale.test",
+		Policy:       types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
+		DERP: types.DERPConfig{
+			ServerEnabled: false,
+			DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
+				Regions: map[int]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
+			},
+		},
+		Tuning: types.Tuning{
+			BatchChangeDelay: 10 * time.Millisecond,
+			BatcherWorkers:   workers,
+			// Production defaults: coalesce writes so the storm is not
+			// exaggerated by an unrealistically small NodeStore batch.
+			NodeStoreBatchSize:    100,
+			NodeStoreBatchTimeout: 500 * time.Millisecond,
+		},
+	}
+
+	database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+
+	users := database.CreateUsersForTest(1, "testuser")
+	dbNodes := database.CreateRegisteredNodesForTest(users[0], nodeCount, "node")
+
+	allNodes := make([]node, 0, nodeCount)
+	for i := range dbNodes {
+		allNodes = append(allNodes, node{
+			n:  dbNodes[i],
+			ch: make(chan *tailcfg.MapResponse, normalBufferSize),
+		})
+	}
+
+	st, err := state.NewState(cfg)
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+
+	derpMap, err := derp.GetDERPMap(cfg.DERP)
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+	st.SetDERPMap(derpMap)
+
+	_, err = st.SetPolicy([]byte(policy))
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+
+	batcher := wrapBatcherForTest(NewBatcherAndMapper(cfg, st), st)
+	batcher.Start()
+
+	td := &TestData{
+		Database: database,
+		Users:    users,
+		Nodes:    allNodes,
+		State:    st,
+		Config:   cfg,
+		Batcher:  batcher,
+	}
+
+	return td, func() {
+		batcher.Close()
+		st.Close()
+		database.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInitialMapNotStarvedByReconnectStorm reproduces juanfont/headscale#3346.
+//
+// When every node redials at once (e.g. after a server upgrade restart), each
+// connection writes the NodeStore (UpdateNodeFromMapRequest + Connect) and the
+// batcher generates its initial map. All of that reads the policy through the
+// PolicyManager. Before the fix the PolicyManager guarded every read with a
+// single exclusive mutex, so the NodeStore writer's O(n^2) BuildPeerMap and
+// every node's FilterForNode serialised against each other. On a per-node
+// filter policy (autogroup:self, via, relay grants) each hold is expensive, so
+// under the storm time-to-initial-map grew without bound.
+//
+// On the production server in #3346 this drove the batcher's per-node
+// total.duration from ~4s to ~76s; tailscale clients aborted the map POST
+// first and reported
+//
+//	PollNetMap: Post ".../machine/map": unexpected EOF
+//
+// then redialled, feeding the storm so it never converged. An allow-all policy
+// does NOT reproduce this — BuildPeerMap is cheap there; the per-node filter
+// path is what makes it expensive, matching a real deployment's ACLs.
+//
+// The fix makes PolicyManager reads take a shared RLock so map generation runs
+// concurrently. AddNode blocks until the initial map is generated and handed to
+// the node channel, so its wall-clock duration is the time-to-initial-map the
+// client experiences. Without the fix this test's slowest node takes ~10s+ at
+// this scale (lock-bound, and more workers do not help); with it, generation
+// parallelises across workers and stays well within a client's patience.
+func TestInitialMapNotStarvedByReconnectStorm(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("timing-sensitive storm regression; skipped in -short")
+	}
+
+	const (
+		nodeCount = 300
+
+		// A per-node-filter policy: forces BuildPeerMap and FilterForNode onto
+		// the slow path that recompiles filter rules per node, the same shape
+		// as a real ACL using autogroup:self / via / relay grants.
+		perNodeFilterPolicy = `{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["autogroup:member"],"dst":["autogroup:self:*"]}]}`
+
+		// Deliberately roomy so it passes on CI's few-core runners, where the
+		// single-writer BuildPeerMap sets the floor (~10s) whatever the reads
+		// do. It still trips on a hang or a return to the ~76s serialised
+		// behaviour; the fine-grained concurrency is verified separately by
+		// TestPolicyManagerConcurrentReads under -race.
+		maxAcceptableLatency = 30 * time.Second
+	)
+
+	// Use the real available parallelism, as production does.
+	workers := runtime.NumCPU()
+
+	td, cleanup := setupStormBatcher(t, nodeCount, workers, perNodeFilterPolicy)
+	defer cleanup()
+
+	latencies := make([]time.Duration, nodeCount)
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	for i := range td.Nodes {
+		wg.Go(func() {
+			n := &td.Nodes[i]
+
+			start := time.Now()
+			err := td.Batcher.AddNode(n.n.ID, n.ch, tailcfg.CapabilityVersion(100), nil)
+			latencies[i] = time.Since(start)
+
+			assert.NoError(t, err) //nolint:testifylint // assert (not require) is correct off the test goroutine
+		})
+	}
+
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	slices.Sort(latencies)
+	p50 := latencies[len(latencies)/2]
+	p95 := latencies[len(latencies)*95/100]
+	maxLatency := latencies[len(latencies)-1]
+	t.Logf("initial-map latency over %d nodes (workers=%d): p50=%s p95=%s max=%s",
+		nodeCount, workers, p50, p95, maxLatency)
+
+	require.Less(t, maxLatency, maxAcceptableLatency,
+		"slowest initial map took %s: policy reads are serialising instead of running concurrently (issue #3346)", maxLatency)
+}

hscontrol/mapper/mapper_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package mapper
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
@@ -536,6 +537,94 @@ func TestBuildFromChangeVisibilityMatchesFullMap(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestFullMapResponseSurvivesPeerWithInvalidName proves a single node with an
+// FQDN-invalid GivenName must not break map generation for its peers.
+//
+// A node whose stored GivenName is empty (ErrNodeHasNoGivenName) or yields an
+// FQDN longer than MaxHostnameLength (ErrHostnameTooLong) makes GetFQDN, and
+// therefore TailNode, return an error. buildTailPeers used to abort the entire
+// peer list on the first such error, so MapResponseBuilder.Build() failed for
+// every node that could see the bad peer; on the initial-connection path that
+// surfaced as "PollNetMap: ... unexpected EOF" and the "Unable to connect to
+// the Tailscale coordination server" health warning. A legacy DB row loads
+// verbatim (NewNodeStore reads db.ListNodes() without re-sanitising names), so
+// the bad peer persists across restart. The build for an unaffected viewer
+// must succeed: the bad peer is dropped, valid peers and self survive.
+func TestFullMapResponseSurvivesPeerWithInvalidName(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tt := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		badName string
+	}{
+		{"empty given name", ""},
+		{"over-long fqdn", strings.Repeat("a", types.MaxHostnameLength+1)},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			tmp := t.TempDir()
+			p4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
+			p6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
+			cfg := &types.Config{
+				Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
+					Type:   types.DatabaseSqlite,
+					Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmp + "/h.db"},
+				},
+				PrefixV4:     &p4,
+				PrefixV6:     &p6,
+				IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
+				BaseDomain:   "headscale.test",
+				Policy:       types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
+				DERP: types.DERPConfig{
+					DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
+						Regions: map[int]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
+					},
+				},
+				Tuning: types.Tuning{
+					NodeStoreBatchSize:    state.TestBatchSize,
+					NodeStoreBatchTimeout: state.TestBatchTimeout,
+				},
+			}
+
+			database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			user := database.CreateUserForTest("u1")
+			n1 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "n1")     // viewer, valid
+			bad := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "bad")   // peer, name corrupted below
+			good := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "good") // peer, valid control
+
+			// Simulate a legacy/corrupt row that v29 loads verbatim.
+			require.NoError(t, database.DB.
+				Model(&types.Node{}).
+				Where("id = ?", bad.ID).
+				Update("given_name", tt.badName).Error)
+			require.NoError(t, database.Close())
+
+			s, err := state.NewState(cfg)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
+
+			// Allow-all so n1 sees both peers; the bad one must still be dropped.
+			_, err = s.SetPolicy([]byte(`{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["*"],"dst":["*:*"]}]}`))
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+
+			m := &mapper{state: s, cfg: cfg}
+			capVer := tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion
+
+			resp, err := m.fullMapResponse(n1.ID, capVer)
+			require.NoError(t, err, "n1's map must build despite a peer with an invalid name")
+			require.NotNil(t, resp)
+			require.NotNil(t, resp.Node, "n1 must receive its own self node")
+
+			peers := map[tailcfg.NodeID]bool{}
+			for _, p := range resp.Peers {
+				peers[p.ID] = true
+			}
+
+			assert.False(t, peers[bad.ID.NodeID()], "the peer with an invalid name must be dropped")
+			assert.True(t, peers[good.ID.NodeID()], "valid peers must remain in the map")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // TestGenerateDNSConfigNilHostinfoNoPanic proves generateDNSConfig does not
 // panic when a node's Hostinfo is nil (e.g. a legacy DB row with a NULL
 // host_info column). addNextDNSMetadata dereferenced node.Hostinfo().OS()

hscontrol/noise_test.go

@@ -459,6 +459,71 @@ func TestSSHActionHandler_RejectsMissingSessionWithoutCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		"a bogus auth_id with no active check must be rejected, body=%s", rec.Body.String())
 }
 
+// TestTS2021Route_AcceptsGETAndPOST reproduces a regression where the
+// browser/WASM control client could not connect. Tailscale's JS/WASM control
+// client opens /ts2021 as a WebSocket, which is an HTTP GET upgrade; the native
+// Go client uses an HTTP POST upgrade. The gorilla->chi router migration
+// registered /ts2021 for POST only, so the GET WebSocket handshake was rejected
+// with 405 Method Not Allowed by the router before it could reach
+// NoiseUpgradeHandler. Both methods must route to the handler.
+//
+// NoiseUpgradeHandler dispatches on the Upgrade header, not the HTTP method, so
+// once the route is reachable the handler handles both upgrade styles. The
+// httptest recorder is not an http.Hijacker, so the upgrade itself fails past
+// the router (501 for the WebSocket path, 400 for the native path) — the point
+// is only that neither is 405, i.e. the router no longer rejects GET early.
+func TestTS2021Route_AcceptsGETAndPOST(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	handler := createTestApp(t).HTTPHandler()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		method  string
+		headers map[string]string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:   "websocket_get_from_wasm_client",
+			method: http.MethodGet,
+			headers: map[string]string{
+				"Connection":             "Upgrade",
+				"Upgrade":                "websocket",
+				"Sec-WebSocket-Version":  "13",
+				"Sec-WebSocket-Key":      "dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==",
+				"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol": "tailscale-control-protocol",
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "native_post_upgrade",
+			method: http.MethodPost,
+			headers: map[string]string{
+				"Connection":            "upgrade",
+				"Upgrade":               "tailscale-control-protocol",
+				"X-Tailscale-Handshake": "AAAA",
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), tt.method,
+				"/ts2021?X-Tailscale-Handshake=AAAA", nil)
+			for k, v := range tt.headers {
+				req.Header.Set(k, v)
+			}
+
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, rec.Code,
+				"%s /ts2021 must reach NoiseUpgradeHandler, not be rejected by the router with 405",
+				tt.method)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // newSSHActionFollowUpRequest is like newSSHActionRequest but carries the
 // auth_id query parameter that marks a follow-up poll.
 func newSSHActionFollowUpRequest(t *testing.T, src, dst types.NodeID, authID types.AuthID) *http.Request {

hscontrol/policy/v2/policy.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy/matcher"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy/policyutil"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v4"
 	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
 	"go4.org/netipx"
 	"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
@@ -28,7 +29,10 @@ import (
 var ErrInvalidTagOwner = errors.New("tag owner is not an Alias")
 
 type PolicyManager struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
+	// RWMutex, not Mutex, so concurrent map generation does not serialise on
+	// reads. The per-node caches are xsync.Maps so a read can fill them without
+	// taking the write lock.
+	mu    sync.RWMutex
 	pol   *Policy
 	users []types.User
 	nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView]
@@ -55,7 +59,7 @@ type PolicyManager struct {
 	viaTargetTags  map[Tag]struct{}
 
 	// Lazy map of SSH policies
-	sshPolicyMap map[types.NodeID]*tailcfg.SSHPolicy
+	sshPolicyMap *xsync.Map[types.NodeID, *tailcfg.SSHPolicy]
 
 	// compiledGrants are the grants with sources pre-resolved.
 	// The single source of truth for filter compilation. Both
@@ -64,12 +68,12 @@ type PolicyManager struct {
 	userNodeIdx    userNodeIndex
 
 	// Lazy map of per-node filter rules (reduced, for packet filters)
-	filterRulesMap map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule
+	filterRulesMap *xsync.Map[types.NodeID, []tailcfg.FilterRule]
 
 	// Lazy map of per-node matchers derived from UNREDUCED filter
 	// rules. Only populated on the slow path when needsPerNodeFilter
 	// is true; the fast path returns pm.matchers directly.
-	matchersForNodeMap map[types.NodeID][]matcher.Match
+	matchersForNodeMap *xsync.Map[types.NodeID, []matcher.Match]
 
 	// needsPerNodeFilter is true when any compiled grant requires
 	// per-node work (autogroup:self or via grants).
@@ -197,9 +201,9 @@ func NewPolicyManager(b []byte, users []types.User, nodes views.Slice[types.Node
 		pol:                policy,
 		users:              users,
 		nodes:              nodes,
-		sshPolicyMap:       make(map[types.NodeID]*tailcfg.SSHPolicy, nodes.Len()),
-		filterRulesMap:     make(map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule, nodes.Len()),
-		matchersForNodeMap: make(map[types.NodeID][]matcher.Match, nodes.Len()),
+		sshPolicyMap:       xsync.NewMap[types.NodeID, *tailcfg.SSHPolicy](),
+		filterRulesMap:     xsync.NewMap[types.NodeID, []tailcfg.FilterRule](),
+		matchersForNodeMap: xsync.NewMap[types.NodeID, []matcher.Match](),
 	}
 
 	_, err = pm.updateLocked()
@@ -354,9 +358,9 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) updateLocked() (bool, error) {
 		// TODO(kradalby): This could potentially be optimized by only clearing the
 		// policies for nodes that have changed. Particularly if the only difference is
 		// that nodes has been added or removed.
-		clear(pm.sshPolicyMap)
-		clear(pm.filterRulesMap)
-		clear(pm.matchersForNodeMap)
+		pm.sshPolicyMap.Clear()
+		pm.filterRulesMap.Clear()
+		pm.matchersForNodeMap.Clear()
 	}
 
 	// If nothing changed, no need to update nodes
@@ -400,8 +404,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeNeedsPeerRecompute(node types.NodeView) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	if pm.relayTargetIPs != nil && node.InIPSet(pm.relayTargetIPs) {
 		return true
@@ -422,10 +426,10 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeNeedsPeerRecompute(node types.NodeView) bool {
 // /machine/ssh/action/{src}/to/{dst}?local_user={local_user} per the
 // SaaS wire format. Cache is invalidated on policy reload.
 func (pm *PolicyManager) SSHPolicy(baseURL string, node types.NodeView) (*tailcfg.SSHPolicy, error) {
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
-	if sshPol, ok := pm.sshPolicyMap[node.ID()]; ok {
+	if sshPol, ok := pm.sshPolicyMap.Load(node.ID()); ok {
 		return sshPol, nil
 	}
 
@@ -434,7 +438,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) SSHPolicy(baseURL string, node types.NodeView) (*tailcf
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("compiling SSH policy: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	pm.sshPolicyMap[node.ID()] = sshPol
+	pm.sshPolicyMap.Store(node.ID(), sshPol)
 
 	return sshPol, nil
 }
@@ -450,8 +454,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) SSHPolicy(baseURL string, node types.NodeView) (*tailcf
 func (pm *PolicyManager) SSHCheckParams(
 	srcNodeID, dstNodeID types.NodeID,
 ) (time.Duration, bool) {
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	if pm.pol == nil || len(pm.pol.SSHs) == 0 {
 		return 0, false
@@ -584,8 +588,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) Filter() ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, []matcher.Match) {
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	return pm.filter, pm.matchers
 }
@@ -604,8 +608,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) BuildPeerMap(nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView]) map[typ
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// Precompute each node's subnet routes and exit-node status once; the
 	// O(n^2) pair scans below would otherwise recompute them for every pair.
@@ -726,7 +730,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) filterForNodeLocked(
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if rules, ok := pm.filterRulesMap[node.ID()]; ok {
+	if rules, ok := pm.filterRulesMap.Load(node.ID()); ok {
 		return rules
 	}
 
@@ -738,7 +742,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) filterForNodeLocked(
 	}
 
 	reduced := policyutil.ReduceFilterRules(node, unreduced)
-	pm.filterRulesMap[node.ID()] = reduced
+	pm.filterRulesMap.Store(node.ID(), reduced)
 
 	return reduced
 }
@@ -755,8 +759,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) FilterForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]tailcfg.FilterRul
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	return pm.filterForNodeLocked(node), nil
 }
@@ -776,8 +780,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) MatchersForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]matcher.Match,
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// For global policies, return the shared global matchers.
 	// Via grants require per-node matchers because the global matchers
@@ -786,7 +790,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) MatchersForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]matcher.Match,
 		return pm.matchers, nil
 	}
 
-	if cached, ok := pm.matchersForNodeMap[node.ID()]; ok {
+	if cached, ok := pm.matchersForNodeMap.Load(node.ID()); ok {
 		return cached, nil
 	}
 
@@ -794,7 +798,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) MatchersForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]matcher.Match,
 	// the stored compiled grants for this specific node.
 	unreduced := pm.filterRulesForNodeLocked(node)
 	matchers := matcher.MatchesFromFilterRules(unreduced)
-	pm.matchersForNodeMap[node.ID()] = matchers
+	pm.matchersForNodeMap.Store(node.ID(), matchers)
 
 	return matchers, nil
 }
@@ -813,7 +817,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) SetUsers(users []types.User) (bool, error) {
 	// Clear SSH policy map when users change to force SSH policy recomputation
 	// This ensures that if SSH policy compilation previously failed due to missing users,
 	// it will be retried with the new user list
-	clear(pm.sshPolicyMap)
+	pm.sshPolicyMap.Clear()
 
 	changed, err := pm.updateLocked()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -866,9 +870,9 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) SetNodes(nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView]) (bool, erro
 
 		if !needsUpdate {
 			// This ensures fresh filter rules are generated for all nodes
-			clear(pm.sshPolicyMap)
-			clear(pm.filterRulesMap)
-			clear(pm.matchersForNodeMap)
+			pm.sshPolicyMap.Clear()
+			pm.filterRulesMap.Clear()
+			pm.matchersForNodeMap.Clear()
 		}
 		// Always return true when nodes changed, even if filter hash didn't change
 		// (can happen with autogroup:self or when nodes are added but don't affect rules)
@@ -921,8 +925,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeCanHaveTag(node types.NodeView, tag string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// pm.pol is written by SetPolicy under pm.mu; reading it before the
 	// lock races with concurrent policy reloads.
@@ -1010,8 +1014,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) TagExists(tag string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// pm.pol is written by SetPolicy under pm.mu; reading it before the
 	// lock races with concurrent policy reloads.
@@ -1029,8 +1033,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeCanApproveRoute(node types.NodeView, route netip.Pr
 		return false
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// If the route to-be-approved is an exit route, then we need to check
 	// if the node is in allowed to approve it. This is treated differently
@@ -1092,8 +1096,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) ViaRoutesForPeer(viewer, peer types.NodeView) types.Via
 		return result
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	// pm.pol is written by SetPolicy under pm.mu; reading it before the
 	// lock races with concurrent policy reloads.
@@ -1311,8 +1315,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) DebugString() string {
 
 	// pm.pol, filter, matchers, and the derived maps are all written
 	// under pm.mu by SetPolicy/SetUsers/SetNodes.
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	var sb strings.Builder
 
@@ -1475,7 +1479,7 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(oldNodes, newNodes views.S
 	// Clear cache entries for affected users only.
 	// For autogroup:self, we need to clear all nodes belonging to affected users
 	// because autogroup:self rules depend on the entire user's device set.
-	for nodeID := range pm.filterRulesMap {
+	pm.filterRulesMap.Range(func(nodeID types.NodeID, _ []tailcfg.FilterRule) bool {
 		// Find the user for this cached node
 		var nodeUserID types.UserID
 
@@ -1518,20 +1522,22 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(oldNodes, newNodes views.S
 		// If we found the user and they're affected, clear this cache entry
 		if found {
 			if _, affected := affectedUsers[nodeUserID]; affected {
-				delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
-				delete(pm.matchersForNodeMap, nodeID)
+				pm.filterRulesMap.Delete(nodeID)
+				pm.matchersForNodeMap.Delete(nodeID)
 			}
 		} else {
 			// Node not found in either old or new list, clear it
-			delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
-			delete(pm.matchersForNodeMap, nodeID)
+			pm.filterRulesMap.Delete(nodeID)
+			pm.matchersForNodeMap.Delete(nodeID)
 		}
-	}
+
+		return true
+	})
 
 	if len(affectedUsers) > 0 {
 		log.Debug().
 			Int("affected_users", len(affectedUsers)).
-			Int("remaining_cache_entries", len(pm.filterRulesMap)).
+			Int("remaining_cache_entries", pm.filterRulesMap.Size()).
 			Msg("Selectively cleared autogroup:self cache for affected users")
 	}
 }
@@ -1572,23 +1578,27 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) invalidateGlobalPolicyCache(newNodes views.Slice[types.
 		}
 
 		if newNode.HasNetworkChanges(oldNode) {
-			delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
-			delete(pm.matchersForNodeMap, nodeID)
+			pm.filterRulesMap.Delete(nodeID)
+			pm.matchersForNodeMap.Delete(nodeID)
 		}
 	}
 
 	// Remove deleted nodes from cache
-	for nodeID := range pm.filterRulesMap {
+	pm.filterRulesMap.Range(func(nodeID types.NodeID, _ []tailcfg.FilterRule) bool {
 		if _, exists := newNodeMap[nodeID]; !exists {
-			delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
+			pm.filterRulesMap.Delete(nodeID)
 		}
-	}
 
-	for nodeID := range pm.matchersForNodeMap {
+		return true
+	})
+
+	pm.matchersForNodeMap.Range(func(nodeID types.NodeID, _ []matcher.Match) bool {
 		if _, exists := newNodeMap[nodeID]; !exists {
-			delete(pm.matchersForNodeMap, nodeID)
+			pm.matchersForNodeMap.Delete(nodeID)
 		}
-	}
+
+		return true
+	})
 }
 
 // flattenTags resolves nested tag-owner references. Cycles
@@ -1770,8 +1780,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeCapMap(id types.NodeID) tailcfg.NodeCapMap {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	src := pm.nodeAttrsMap[id]
 	if len(src) == 0 {
@@ -1794,8 +1804,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) NodeCapMaps() map[types.NodeID]tailcfg.NodeCapMap {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	out := make(map[types.NodeID]tailcfg.NodeCapMap, len(pm.nodeAttrsMap))
 	maps.Copy(out, pm.nodeAttrsMap)

hscontrol/policy/v2/policy_concurrency_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package v2
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+// TestPolicyManagerConcurrentReads is the correctness guard for the #3346 fix:
+// PolicyManager read methods take a shared RLock and populate their per-node
+// caches (filterRulesMap, matchersForNodeMap) concurrently. This test hammers
+// those reads from many goroutines while a writer mutates the node set, so the
+// race detector catches any unsafe access to the shared caches or policy state.
+//
+// It uses an autogroup:self policy so reads take the per-node filter slow path
+// — the same path that made #3346's reconnect storm expensive — which is where
+// the lazy caches are written.
+func TestPolicyManagerConcurrentReads(t *testing.T) {
+	users := types.Users{
+		{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1", Email: "user1@headscale.net"},
+		{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2", Email: "user2@headscale.net"},
+		{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 3}, Name: "user3", Email: "user3@headscale.net"},
+	}
+
+	policy := `{
+		"acls": [
+			{
+				"action": "accept",
+				"src": ["autogroup:member"],
+				"dst": ["autogroup:self:*"]
+			}
+		]
+	}`
+
+	const nodeCount = 60
+
+	nodes := make(types.Nodes, 0, nodeCount)
+	for i := range nodeCount {
+		n := node(
+			fmt.Sprintf("node%d", i),
+			fmt.Sprintf("100.64.0.%d", i+1),
+			fmt.Sprintf("fd7a:115c:a1e0::%d", i+1),
+			users[i%len(users)],
+		)
+		n.ID = types.NodeID(i + 1) //nolint:gosec // safe in test
+		nodes = append(nodes, n)
+	}
+
+	pm, err := NewPolicyManager([]byte(policy), users, nodes.ViewSlice())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	const (
+		readers        = 16
+		iterations     = 60
+		mutatorReloads = 30
+	)
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	// Concurrent readers exercise every converted RLock read path, including
+	// the two lazily populated per-node caches. Assertions inside the
+	// goroutines use assert (not require) so a failure does not call
+	// t.FailNow from a non-test goroutine.
+	for r := range readers {
+		wg.Go(func() {
+			for i := range iterations {
+				nv := nodes[(r+i)%len(nodes)].View()
+
+				rules, err := pm.FilterForNode(nv)
+				assert.NoError(t, err) //nolint:testifylint // assert (not require) is correct off the test goroutine
+				assert.NotNil(t, rules)
+
+				_, err = pm.MatchersForNode(nv)
+				assert.NoError(t, err) //nolint:testifylint // assert (not require) is correct off the test goroutine
+
+				pm.Filter()
+				pm.NodeCapMap(nv.ID())
+
+				// BuildPeerMap is the O(n^2) writer-side read; exercise it
+				// under RLock too, but not every iteration.
+				if i%8 == 0 {
+					assert.NotNil(t, pm.BuildPeerMap(nodes.ViewSlice()))
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	// A writer repeatedly re-sets the node set, invalidating and racing the
+	// caches the readers are populating.
+	wg.Go(func() {
+		for range mutatorReloads {
+			_, err := pm.SetNodes(nodes.ViewSlice())
+			assert.NoError(t, err) //nolint:testifylint // assert (not require) is correct off the test goroutine
+		}
+	})
+
+	wg.Wait()
+}

hscontrol/policy/v2/policy_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy/matcher"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v4"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 	"tailscale.com/net/tsaddr"
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ func TestInvalidateAutogroupSelfCache(t *testing.T) {
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 	}
 
-	require.Len(t, pm.filterRulesMap, len(initialNodes))
+	require.Equal(t, len(initialNodes), pm.filterRulesMap.Size())
 
 	tests := []struct {
 		name            string
@@ -207,19 +208,20 @@ func TestInvalidateAutogroupSelfCache(t *testing.T) {
 				}
 			}
 
-			pm.filterRulesMap = make(map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule)
+			pm.filterRulesMap.Clear()
+
 			for _, n := range initialNodes {
 				_, err := pm.FilterForNode(n.View())
 				require.NoError(t, err)
 			}
 
-			initialCacheSize := len(pm.filterRulesMap)
+			initialCacheSize := pm.filterRulesMap.Size()
 			require.Equal(t, len(initialNodes), initialCacheSize)
 
 			pm.invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(initialNodes.ViewSlice(), tt.newNodes.ViewSlice())
 
 			// Verify the expected number of cache entries were cleared
-			finalCacheSize := len(pm.filterRulesMap)
+			finalCacheSize := pm.filterRulesMap.Size()
 			clearedEntries := initialCacheSize - finalCacheSize
 			require.Equal(t, tt.expectedCleared, clearedEntries, tt.description)
 		})
@@ -498,15 +500,19 @@ func TestInvalidateGlobalPolicyCache(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			pm := &PolicyManager{
-				nodes:          tt.oldNodes.ViewSlice(),
-				filterRulesMap: tt.initialCache,
+				nodes:              tt.oldNodes.ViewSlice(),
+				filterRulesMap:     xsync.NewMap[types.NodeID, []tailcfg.FilterRule](),
+				matchersForNodeMap: xsync.NewMap[types.NodeID, []matcher.Match](),
+			}
+			for id, rules := range tt.initialCache {
+				pm.filterRulesMap.Store(id, rules)
 			}
 
 			pm.invalidateGlobalPolicyCache(tt.newNodes.ViewSlice())
 
 			// Verify cache state
 			for nodeID, shouldExist := range tt.expectedCacheAfter {
-				_, exists := pm.filterRulesMap[nodeID]
+				_, exists := pm.filterRulesMap.Load(nodeID)
 				require.Equal(t, shouldExist, exists, "node %d cache existence mismatch", nodeID)
 			}
 		})

hscontrol/policy/v2/sshtest.go

@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) RunSSHTests() error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	cache := make(map[types.NodeID]*tailcfg.SSHPolicy)
 	results := runSSHPolicyTests(pm.pol, pm.users, pm.nodes, cache)

hscontrol/policy/v2/test.go

@@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) RunTests() error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	pm.mu.Lock()
-	defer pm.mu.Unlock()
+	pm.mu.RLock()
+	defer pm.mu.RUnlock()
 
 	results := runPolicyTests(pm.pol, pm.filter, pm.users, pm.nodes)
 	if results.AllPassed {

hscontrol/poll.go

@@ -230,6 +230,11 @@ func (m *mapSession) serveLongPoll() {
 	mapReqChange, err := m.h.state.UpdateNodeFromMapRequest(m.node.ID, m.req)
 	if err != nil {
 		m.log.Error().Caller().Err(err).Msg("failed to update node from initial MapRequest")
+		// Write an explicit error rather than returning silently: a bare
+		// return leaves net/http to send an empty 200, which the client
+		// reads as "unexpected EOF" and retries forever (issue #3346).
+		httpError(m.w, err)
+
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -252,6 +257,11 @@ func (m *mapSession) serveLongPoll() {
 	// time between the node connecting and the batcher being ready.
 	if err := m.h.mapBatcher.AddNode(m.node.ID, m.ch, m.capVer, m.stopFromBatcher); err != nil { //nolint:noinlineerr
 		m.log.Error().Caller().Err(err).Msg("failed to add node to batcher")
+		// Write an explicit error rather than returning silently: a bare
+		// return leaves net/http to send an empty 200, which the client
+		// reads as "unexpected EOF" and retries forever (issue #3346).
+		httpError(m.w, err)
+
 		return
 	}
 

hscontrol/poll_test.go

@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/db"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/mapper"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/state"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
 	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types/change"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -89,6 +91,131 @@ func (w *delayedSuccessResponseWriter) WriteCount() int {
 	return w.writeCount
 }
 
+// recordingResponseWriter records the status code and whether anything was
+// written, so a test can tell an explicit error response apart from a handler
+// that returned without writing (which net/http turns into an empty 200 the
+// client reads as "unexpected EOF").
+type recordingResponseWriter struct {
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	header http.Header
+	status int
+	writes int
+}
+
+func (w *recordingResponseWriter) Header() http.Header {
+	if w.header == nil {
+		w.header = make(http.Header)
+	}
+
+	return w.header
+}
+
+func (w *recordingResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if w.status == 0 {
+		w.status = code
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *recordingResponseWriter) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if w.status == 0 {
+		w.status = http.StatusOK
+	}
+
+	w.writes++
+
+	return len(data), nil
+}
+
+func (w *recordingResponseWriter) Flush() {}
+
+func (w *recordingResponseWriter) statusCode() int {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return w.status
+}
+
+// TestServeLongPollWritesErrorWhenInitialMapFails proves that when the initial
+// map cannot be generated (here: the node's own GivenName is invalid, so
+// WithSelfNode fails and AddNode errors), serveLongPoll writes an explicit HTTP
+// error instead of returning with no body. Returning empty leaves net/http to
+// send an empty 200, which the Tailscale client reports as
+// "PollNetMap: ... unexpected EOF" and retries forever (issue #3346).
+func TestServeLongPollWritesErrorWhenInitialMapFails(t *testing.T) {
+	app := createTestApp(t)
+	user := app.state.CreateUserForTest("self-bad-name-user")
+	createdNode := app.state.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "self-bad-name-node")
+
+	// Corrupt the node's stored name to empty so GetFQDN fails for itself,
+	// then reload state so the bad row enters the NodeStore verbatim.
+	app.mapBatcher.Close()
+	require.NoError(t, app.state.Close())
+
+	database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(app.cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, database.DB.
+		Model(&types.Node{}).
+		Where("id = ?", createdNode.ID).
+		Update("given_name", "").Error)
+	require.NoError(t, database.Close())
+
+	app.state, err = state.NewState(app.cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	app.mapBatcher = mapper.NewBatcherAndMapper(app.cfg, app.state)
+	app.mapBatcher.Start()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		app.mapBatcher.Close()
+		require.NoError(t, app.state.Close())
+	})
+
+	nodeView, ok := app.state.GetNodeByID(createdNode.ID)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+
+	node := nodeView.AsStruct()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	writer := &recordingResponseWriter{}
+	session := app.newMapSession(ctx, tailcfg.MapRequest{
+		Stream:  true,
+		Version: tailcfg.CapabilityVersion(100),
+	}, writer, node)
+
+	serveDone := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		session.serveLongPoll()
+		close(serveDone)
+	}()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		// Break the post-disconnect reconnect wait so the goroutine exits.
+		dummyCh := make(chan *tailcfg.MapResponse, 1)
+		_ = app.mapBatcher.AddNode(node.ID, dummyCh, tailcfg.CapabilityVersion(100), nil)
+
+		cancel()
+
+		select {
+		case <-serveDone:
+		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		}
+
+		_ = app.mapBatcher.RemoveNode(node.ID, dummyCh)
+	})
+
+	assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		return writer.statusCode() >= http.StatusInternalServerError
+	}, 2*time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond,
+		"serveLongPoll must write an HTTP error response when the initial map cannot be built, not an empty 200")
+}
+
 // TestGitHubIssue3129_TransientlyBlockedWriteDoesNotLeaveLiveStaleSession
 // tests the scenario reported in
 // https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3129.

hscontrol/state/node_health.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package state
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/util/zlog/zf"
+	"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
+)
+
+// nodeHealthCheck names a class of stored-node-data defect that breaks normal
+// operation and explains how to fix it. ok == true means the node passes the
+// check. This is the extension point for node-data validation: add a check
+// here as new corrupt-data classes surface (nil hostinfo, invalid IPs,
+// tags-XOR-user violations, ...) and both the boot scan and any future caller
+// run the whole set.
+type nodeHealthCheck struct {
+	name  string
+	check func(nv types.NodeView, cfg *types.Config) (problem, fixHint string, ok bool)
+}
+
+// nodeHealthChecks is the registry of node-data health checks. Today it carries
+// the one issue #3346 needs; append to it rather than reshaping callers.
+var nodeHealthChecks = []nodeHealthCheck{givenNameMapsToValidFQDN}
+
+// givenNameMapsToValidFQDN flags a node whose stored GivenName cannot produce a
+// valid FQDN (empty, or longer than MaxHostnameLength once base_domain is
+// applied). Such a node cannot be rendered into a netmap — neither its own nor
+// any peer's — so it must be renamed to recover.
+var givenNameMapsToValidFQDN = nodeHealthCheck{
+	name: "given-name-maps-to-valid-fqdn",
+	check: func(nv types.NodeView, cfg *types.Config) (string, string, bool) {
+		err := types.ValidateGivenName(nv.GivenName(), cfg.BaseDomain)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("headscale nodes rename %d <name>", nv.ID()), false
+		}
+
+		return "", "", true
+	},
+}
+
+// nodeHealthFinding is a single failed check for a single node.
+type nodeHealthFinding struct {
+	nodeID   types.NodeID
+	hostname string
+	check    string
+	problem  string
+	fixHint  string
+}
+
+// scanNodeHealth runs every registered check against every node in the store
+// and returns one finding per failure. It only reports — it never mutates a
+// node — so an operator can repair the underlying data without the server
+// silently rewriting a user-visible name.
+func (s *State) scanNodeHealth() []nodeHealthFinding {
+	var findings []nodeHealthFinding
+
+	for _, nv := range s.nodeStore.ListNodes().All() {
+		for _, c := range nodeHealthChecks {
+			problem, fixHint, ok := c.check(nv, s.cfg)
+			if ok {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			findings = append(findings, nodeHealthFinding{
+				nodeID:   nv.ID(),
+				hostname: nv.Hostname(),
+				check:    c.name,
+				problem:  problem,
+				fixHint:  fixHint,
+			})
+		}
+	}
+
+	return findings
+}
+
+// logNodeHealth scans the store once and logs an actionable warning per
+// finding. Called at startup so an operator learns — by node id and fix
+// command — about stored data that will break map generation, without the
+// server changing anything itself.
+func (s *State) logNodeHealth() {
+	for _, f := range s.scanNodeHealth() {
+		log.Warn().
+			Uint64(zf.NodeID, f.nodeID.Uint64()).
+			Str(zf.NodeHostname, f.hostname).
+			Str("check", f.check).
+			Str("problem", f.problem).
+			Str("fix", f.fixHint).
+			Msg("node has invalid data that breaks map generation; rename it to restore connectivity")
+	}
+}

hscontrol/state/node_health_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+package state
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/db"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestGivenNameMapsToValidFQDNCheck(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &types.Config{BaseDomain: "example.com"}
+
+	_, _, ok := givenNameMapsToValidFQDN.check((&types.Node{ID: 1, GivenName: "valid"}).View(), cfg)
+	require.True(t, ok, "a valid given name must pass the check")
+
+	problem, fixHint, ok := givenNameMapsToValidFQDN.check((&types.Node{ID: 7, GivenName: ""}).View(), cfg)
+	require.False(t, ok, "an empty given name must fail the check")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, problem)
+	require.Contains(t, fixHint, "rename 7", "fix hint must name the offending node")
+}
+
+// TestScanNodeHealthReportsInvalidNameWithoutMutating proves the boot scan
+// reports a node whose stored name would break map generation (issue #3346)
+// with an actionable fix, and that it never rewrites the stored name — the
+// maintainer's decision is log-only, no silent mutation.
+func TestScanNodeHealthReportsInvalidNameWithoutMutating(t *testing.T) {
+	dbPath := t.TempDir() + "/headscale.db"
+	cfg := persistTestConfig(dbPath)
+
+	database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := database.CreateUserForTest("scan-user")
+	bad := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "scan-bad")
+	good := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "scan-good")
+
+	require.NoError(t, database.DB.
+		Model(&types.Node{}).
+		Where("id = ?", bad.ID).
+		Update("given_name", "").Error)
+	require.NoError(t, database.Close())
+
+	s, err := NewState(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
+
+	findings := s.scanNodeHealth()
+
+	var badFinding *nodeHealthFinding
+
+	for i := range findings {
+		require.NotEqual(t, good.ID, findings[i].nodeID, "a valid node must not be reported")
+
+		if findings[i].nodeID == bad.ID {
+			badFinding = &findings[i]
+		}
+	}
+
+	require.NotNil(t, badFinding, "a node with an invalid name must be reported")
+	require.Contains(t, badFinding.fixHint, "rename", "finding must carry an actionable fix")
+
+	// Log-only: neither the scan nor boot may rewrite the stored name.
+	nv, ok := s.GetNodeByID(bad.ID)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.Empty(t, nv.GivenName(), "boot scan must not mutate the stored name")
+}

hscontrol/state/rename_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package state
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/db"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestRenameNodeRejectsNameExceedingFQDNLimit proves RenameNode rejects a name
+// that is a valid DNS label but whose FQDN, under the configured base_domain,
+// exceeds MaxHostnameLength. Without the FQDN-length gate such a name persists
+// and then breaks map generation for the node and its peers (issue #3346):
+// admin-facing writes must not be able to introduce an unmappable name.
+func TestRenameNodeRejectsNameExceedingFQDNLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	dbPath := t.TempDir() + "/headscale.db"
+	cfg := persistTestConfig(dbPath)
+	// A long base domain so a 63-char label overflows the 255-char FQDN bound.
+	cfg.BaseDomain = strings.Repeat("b", 200) + ".example.com"
+
+	database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	user := database.CreateUserForTest("rename-user")
+	node := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "rename-node")
+	require.NoError(t, database.Close())
+
+	s, err := NewState(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
+
+	// Valid 63-char DNS label, but the resulting FQDN exceeds 255 chars.
+	_, _, err = s.RenameNode(node.ID, strings.Repeat("a", 63))
+	require.Error(t, err, "rename to a name whose FQDN exceeds the limit must be rejected")
+
+	// A short, valid name is still accepted.
+	_, _, err = s.RenameNode(node.ID, "short")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}

hscontrol/state/state.go

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func NewState(cfg *types.Config) (*State, error) {
 	)
 	nodeStore.Start()
 
-	return &State{
+	s := &State{
 		cfg: cfg,
 
 		db:        db,
@@ -298,7 +298,14 @@ func NewState(cfg *types.Config) (*State, error) {
 
 		sshCheckAuth:  make(map[sshCheckPair]time.Time),
 		registerLocks: xsync.NewMap[key.MachinePublic, *sync.Mutex](),
-	}, nil
+	}
+
+	// Surface nodes whose stored data would break map generation (e.g. an
+	// invalid given name from a legacy row) so an operator can fix them. This
+	// only logs; it never mutates a node's stored name at boot.
+	s.logNodeHealth()
+
+	return s, nil
 }
 
 // Close gracefully shuts down the [State] instance and releases all resources.
@@ -1031,7 +1038,10 @@ func (s *State) SetApprovedRoutes(nodeID types.NodeID, routes []netip.Prefix) (t
 // auto-sanitisation) and collisions error out rather than silently
 // bumping a user-facing label. See HOSTNAME.md for the CLI contract.
 func (s *State) RenameNode(nodeID types.NodeID, newName string) (types.NodeView, change.Change, error) {
-	err := dnsname.ValidLabel(newName)
+	// Validate the label AND that the resulting FQDN fits MaxHostnameLength:
+	// a valid 63-char label can still overflow under a long base_domain, and
+	// an unmappable name would break this node and its peers (issue #3346).
+	err := types.ValidateGivenName(newName, s.cfg.BaseDomain)
 	if err != nil {
 		return types.NodeView{}, change.Change{}, fmt.Errorf("renaming node: %w", err)
 	}

hscontrol/types/node.go

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
 	"tailscale.com/types/key"
 	"tailscale.com/types/views"
+	"tailscale.com/util/dnsname"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -568,6 +569,28 @@ func (node *Node) GetFQDN(baseDomain string) (string, error) {
 	return hostname, nil
 }
 
+// ValidateGivenName reports whether givenName is usable as a node's DNS label:
+// a valid DNS label that, combined with baseDomain, yields an FQDN within
+// MaxHostnameLength. Admin-facing write paths (e.g. node rename) reject names
+// that fail this, since the mapper cannot build a map for a node — or any of
+// its peers — whose GetFQDN fails. Derived paths sanitise/coerce instead.
+func ValidateGivenName(givenName, baseDomain string) error {
+	err := dnsname.ValidLabel(givenName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid DNS label: %w", givenName, err)
+	}
+
+	// Reuse GetFQDN so the length bound stays identical to what the mapper
+	// enforces; a valid 63-char label can still overflow under a long
+	// base_domain.
+	_, err = (&Node{GivenName: givenName}).GetFQDN(baseDomain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // AnnouncedRoutes returns the list of routes the node announces, as
 // reported by the client in [tailcfg.Hostinfo.RoutableIPs]. Announcement alone
 // does not grant visibility — see [Node.SubnetRoutes] for approval-gated

hscontrol/types/node_test.go

@@ -418,6 +418,33 @@ func TestNodeFQDN(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestValidateGivenName(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		givenName  string
+		baseDomain string
+		wantErr    bool
+	}{
+		{"valid", "test", "example.com", false},
+		{"empty", "", "example.com", true},
+		{"invalid label chars", "not valid", "example.com", true},
+		{"label too long", strings.Repeat("a", 64), "example.com", true},
+		// A valid 63-char label whose FQDN overflows only because the base
+		// domain is long: ValidLabel passes, the FQDN-length bound rejects it.
+		{"fqdn too long under long base domain", strings.Repeat("a", 63), strings.Repeat("b", 200) + ".example.com", true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := ValidateGivenName(tc.givenName, tc.baseDomain)
+			if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("ValidateGivenName(%q, %q) error = %v, wantErr %v",
+					tc.givenName, tc.baseDomain, err, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestPeerChangeFromMapRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	nKeys := []key.NodePublic{
 		key.NewNode().Public(),

integration/ts2021_websocket_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+package integration
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/coder/websocket"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/integration/dockertestutil"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/integration/hsic"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/integration/tsic"
+	"github.com/ory/dockertest/v3"
+	"github.com/samber/lo"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"tailscale.com/control/controlbase"
+	"tailscale.com/control/controlhttp/controlhttpcommon"
+	"tailscale.com/net/wsconn"
+	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+	"tailscale.com/util/rands"
+)
+
+// Tailscale's JS/WASM control client opens /ts2021 as a browser WebSocket — an
+// HTTP GET upgrade — rather than the native client's HTTP POST upgrade. A router
+// that registers /ts2021 for POST only rejects that GET with 405 before the
+// Noise handshake starts, which breaks every WASM client (issue #3357).
+//
+// These two tests guard that path against real headscale:
+//
+//   - TestTS2021WebSocketGET dials the WebSocket GET directly from the test
+//     process using the same coder/websocket + controlbase primitives the WASM
+//     client uses. It is fast and always on.
+//   - TestTS2021WASMClientUnderNode runs the *actual* tailscale.com js/wasm
+//     control dial (integration/wasmic/wasmclient, built for GOOS=js) inside a
+//     Node container, alongside normal Tailscale clients, and asserts it
+//     completes the Noise handshake with headscale over the WebSocket.
+//
+// The server cannot tell the two apart: both send GET /ts2021 with
+// Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: tailscale-control-protocol. Before the fix both fail
+// with 405; after it, both complete the handshake.
+
+// TestTS2021WebSocketGET connects to /ts2021 over a WebSocket GET from the test
+// process and completes the Noise handshake, exactly as a browser/WASM client
+// would.
+func TestTS2021WebSocketGET(t *testing.T) {
+	IntegrationSkip(t)
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	spec := ScenarioSpec{
+		NodesPerUser: 1,
+		Users:        []string{"user1"},
+	}
+
+	scenario, err := NewScenario(spec)
+
+	require.NoErrorf(t, err, "failed to create scenario: %s", err)
+	defer scenario.ShutdownAssertNoPanics(t)
+
+	err = scenario.CreateHeadscaleEnv([]tsic.Option{}, hsic.WithTestName("ts2021ws"))
+	requireNoErrHeadscaleEnv(t, err)
+
+	headscale, err := scenario.Headscale()
+	requireNoErrGetHeadscale(t, err)
+
+	conn, err := dialTS2021WebSocket(t, headscale.GetEndpoint(), headscale.GetCert())
+	require.NoError(t, err,
+		"WebSocket GET to /ts2021 must reach NoiseUpgradeHandler, not be rejected by the router with 405")
+	require.NotNil(t, conn)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+
+	t.Logf("noise established over websocket, protocol version %d", conn.ProtocolVersion())
+}
+
+// TestTS2021WASMClientUnderNode runs the real tailscale.com js/wasm control dial
+// inside a Node container against real headscale, next to normal Tailscale
+// clients, and asserts the WASM client completes the /ts2021 handshake.
+func TestTS2021WASMClientUnderNode(t *testing.T) {
+	IntegrationSkip(t)
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	spec := ScenarioSpec{
+		NodesPerUser: 2,
+		Users:        []string{"user1"},
+		Networks: map[string]NetworkSpec{
+			"wasmnet": {Users: []string{"user1"}},
+		},
+		ExtraService: map[string][]extraServiceFunc{
+			"wasmnet": {wasmClientService},
+		},
+		// The wasm client image builds from this module; pair it with the
+		// head Tailscale clients so the whole environment is current.
+		Versions: []string{"head"},
+	}
+
+	scenario, err := NewScenario(spec)
+
+	require.NoErrorf(t, err, "failed to create scenario: %s", err)
+	defer scenario.ShutdownAssertNoPanics(t)
+
+	// The Tailscale JS/WASM client dials the control server as a WebSocket.
+	// client_js.go only honours a custom port for ws:// (plain HTTP); over
+	// wss:// it always targets :443, so it cannot reach a TLS control server on
+	// :8080. Run headscale without TLS, matching the http:// setup in the issue.
+	err = scenario.CreateHeadscaleEnv(
+		[]tsic.Option{},
+		hsic.WithTestName("ts2021wasm"),
+		hsic.WithoutTLS(),
+	)
+	requireNoErrHeadscaleEnv(t, err)
+
+	allClients, err := scenario.ListTailscaleClients()
+	requireNoErrListClients(t, err)
+
+	allIPs, err := scenario.ListTailscaleClientsIPs()
+	requireNoErrListClientIPs(t, err)
+
+	// Normal Tailscale clients come up and form a working tailnet alongside the
+	// WASM control client.
+	err = scenario.WaitForTailscaleSync()
+	requireNoErrSync(t, err)
+
+	headscale, err := scenario.Headscale()
+	requireNoErrGetHeadscale(t, err)
+
+	// Sanity-check the tailnet the WASM client is joining: the normal clients
+	// must be able to reach each other.
+	allAddrs := lo.Map(allIPs, func(x netip.Addr, _ int) string { return x.String() })
+	assertPingAll(t, allClients, allAddrs)
+
+	services, err := scenario.Services("wasmnet")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, services, 1, "expected the wasm client container")
+
+	wasm := services[0]
+	controlURL := headscale.GetEndpoint()
+
+	// Fetch the server's Noise key here and pass it to the WASM client: Go's
+	// net/http DNS resolver is unavailable under GOOS=js, so the client can only
+	// use the JS WebSocket transport, not an HTTP GET to /key.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	controlKey, err := fetchServerNoiseKey(ctx, &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}, controlURL)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	controlKeyText, err := controlKey.MarshalText()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Run the real js/wasm control client under Node: it dials /ts2021 as a
+	// WebSocket GET; success means the Noise handshake completed.
+	stdout, stderr, err := dockertestutil.ExecuteCommand(
+		wasm,
+		[]string{"node", "/app/wasm_exec_node.js", "/app/client.wasm", controlURL, string(controlKeyText)},
+		[]string{},
+		dockertestutil.ExecuteCommandTimeout(60*time.Second),
+	)
+	t.Logf("wasm client stdout:\n%s", stdout)
+	t.Logf("wasm client stderr:\n%s", stderr)
+
+	require.NoError(t, err,
+		"wasm control client must connect to /ts2021 over websocket (405 means the router rejected the GET)")
+	require.Contains(t, stdout, "WASM_TS2021_OK",
+		"wasm control client should report a completed Noise handshake")
+}
+
+// wasmClientService builds and starts the Node + js/wasm control-client
+// container (Dockerfile.wasmclient) on the given network so it can reach
+// headscale by hostname. It idles; the test execs the client on demand.
+func wasmClientService(s *Scenario, networkName string) (*dockertest.Resource, error) {
+	hash := rands.HexString(hsicOIDCMockHashLength)
+	hostname := "hs-wasmclient-" + hash
+
+	network, ok := s.networks[s.prefixedNetworkName(networkName)]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("network does not exist: %s", networkName) //nolint:err113
+	}
+
+	runOpts := &dockertest.RunOptions{
+		Name:     hostname,
+		Networks: []*dockertest.Network{network},
+		Env:      []string{},
+	}
+	dockertestutil.DockerAddIntegrationLabels(runOpts, "wasmclient")
+
+	buildOpts := &dockertest.BuildOptions{
+		Dockerfile: "Dockerfile.wasmclient",
+		ContextDir: dockerContextPath,
+	}
+
+	resource, err := s.pool.BuildAndRunWithBuildOptions(
+		buildOpts,
+		runOpts,
+		dockertestutil.DockerRestartPolicy,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("building wasm client container: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return resource, nil
+}
+
+// dialTS2021WebSocket opens /ts2021 as a WebSocket GET (subprotocol
+// tailscale-control-protocol) and completes the Noise handshake, mirroring what
+// tailscale.com/control/controlhttp/client_js.go does in a browser. It returns
+// the established Noise connection, or an error (a router that only allows POST
+// returns 405 here).
+func dialTS2021WebSocket(t *testing.T, endpoint string, caCert []byte) (*controlbase.Conn, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+
+	u, err := url.Parse(endpoint)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	httpClient := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
+
+	if u.Scheme == "https" {
+		pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+		pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert)
+		httpClient.Transport = &http.Transport{
+			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
+		}
+	}
+
+	controlKey, err := fetchServerNoiseKey(ctx, httpClient, endpoint)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	init, cont, err := controlbase.ClientDeferred(
+		key.NewMachine(),
+		controlKey,
+		uint16(tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	wsScheme := "ws"
+	if u.Scheme == "https" {
+		wsScheme = "wss"
+	}
+
+	wsURL := &url.URL{
+		Scheme: wsScheme,
+		Host:   u.Host,
+		Path:   "/ts2021",
+		RawQuery: url.Values{
+			controlhttpcommon.HandshakeHeaderName: []string{base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(init)},
+		}.Encode(),
+	}
+
+	wsConn, resp, err := websocket.Dial(ctx, wsURL.String(), &websocket.DialOptions{
+		Subprotocols: []string{controlhttpcommon.UpgradeHeaderValue},
+		HTTPClient:   httpClient,
+	})
+	if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	netConn := wsconn.NetConn(ctx, wsConn, websocket.MessageBinary, wsURL.String())
+
+	cbConn, err := cont(ctx, netConn)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = netConn.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("noise handshake over websocket: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return cbConn, nil
+}
+
+// fetchServerNoiseKey retrieves headscale's Noise public key from /key, the same
+// endpoint a real client consults before dialing /ts2021.
+func fetchServerNoiseKey(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	client *http.Client,
+	endpoint string,
+) (key.MachinePublic, error) {
+	var zero key.MachinePublic
+
+	keyURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/key?v=%d", endpoint, tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion)
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, keyURL, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return zero, err
+	}
+
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return zero, err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	var k tailcfg.OverTLSPublicKeyResponse
+
+	err = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&k)
+	if err != nil {
+		return zero, fmt.Errorf("decoding /key response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if k.PublicKey.IsZero() {
+		return zero, errors.New("server returned zero Noise public key") //nolint:err113
+	}
+
+	return k.PublicKey, nil
+}

integration/wasmic/wasmclient/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+//go:build js
+
+// Command wasmclient is a minimal Tailscale control client compiled to
+// GOOS=js/GOARCH=wasm and run under Node. It exercises the real
+// tailscale.com/control/controlhttp js/wasm dial path
+// (control/controlhttp/client_js.go), which opens /ts2021 as a browser-style
+// WebSocket GET — the exact transport a Tailscale JS/WASM client uses.
+//
+// It is the container-side half of the integration test guarding issue #3357:
+// headscale must register /ts2021 for GET, not POST only, or the WebSocket
+// upgrade is rejected with 405 before the Noise handshake can start.
+//
+// It is intentionally not the full tsconnect IPN — the regression is entirely
+// in the control-connection upgrade, and this drives the real upgrade code with
+// the smallest possible harness. On success it prints wasmSuccessMarker and
+// exits 0; on any failure it prints wasmFailureMarker and exits non-zero.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"tailscale.com/control/controlhttp"
+	"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+)
+
+// These markers are matched by the integration test on the client's stdout.
+const (
+	wasmSuccessMarker = "WASM_TS2021_OK"
+	wasmFailureMarker = "WASM_TS2021_FAIL"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	if len(os.Args) < 3 {
+		fmt.Printf("%s: usage: wasmclient <control-url> <noise-key>\n", wasmFailureMarker)
+		os.Exit(2)
+	}
+
+	if err := run(os.Args[1], os.Args[2]); err != nil {
+		fmt.Printf("%s: %v\n", wasmFailureMarker, err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}
+
+// run dials /ts2021 exactly as tailscale.com/control/controlhttp/client_js.go
+// does in a browser: a WebSocket GET via the JS/undici WebSocket. The server's
+// Noise key is passed in (the test fetches /key) rather than fetched here,
+// because Go's net/http DNS resolver is unavailable under GOOS=js — only the
+// WebSocket transport, which runs through the JS host, works.
+func run(controlURL, noiseKeyText string) error {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	u, err := url.Parse(controlURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("parse control url %q: %w", controlURL, err)
+	}
+
+	var controlKey key.MachinePublic
+	if err := controlKey.UnmarshalText([]byte(noiseKeyText)); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("parse noise key %q: %w", noiseKeyText, err)
+	}
+
+	port := u.Port()
+	if port == "" {
+		if u.Scheme == "https" {
+			port = "443"
+		} else {
+			port = "80"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// client_js.go selects ws:// (and appends the port) only when HTTPPort is a
+	// custom non-80 port and HTTPS is 443 or disabled; otherwise it dials wss://
+	// on the default port. Set the fields to match the server's actual scheme.
+	d := &controlhttp.Dialer{
+		Hostname:        u.Hostname(),
+		MachineKey:      key.NewMachine(),
+		ControlKey:      controlKey,
+		ProtocolVersion: uint16(tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion),
+	}
+	if u.Scheme == "https" {
+		d.HTTPSPort = port
+	} else {
+		d.HTTPPort = port
+		d.HTTPSPort = controlhttp.NoPort
+	}
+
+	conn, err := d.Dial(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("ts2021 websocket dial: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	fmt.Printf("%s: noise established over websocket, protocol version %d\n",
+		wasmSuccessMarker, conn.ProtocolVersion())
+
+	return nil
+}

integration/wasmic/wasmclient/stub.go

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+//go:build !js
+
+// This package only does something when built for GOOS=js (see main.go). The
+// stub exists so `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` on the host don't fail with
+// "build constraints exclude all Go files" for this directory.
+package main
+
+func main() {}

mkdocs.yml

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ extra:
     - icon: fontawesome/brands/discord
       link: https://discord.gg/c84AZQhmpx
   headscale:
-    version: 0.29.0
+    version: 0.29.1
 
 # Extensions
 markdown_extensions: