The in-memory upload cache deleted expired incomplete uploads with a raw
os.Remove on the absolute path it had stored, bypassing ScopedFs entirely.
Because the stored path is only lexically cleaned (no symlink evaluation) and
os.Remove resolves symlinked parent directories, a Create-only user could
register an upload and then, within the 3-minute TTL, swap an in-scope
ancestor directory for a symlink so the eviction deleted an arbitrary file
outside their scope.
Carry a removal callback with each cache entry and invoke it on eviction
instead of os.Remove. For TUS uploads the callback deletes via the uploading
user's scoped filesystem, whose Remove is guarded by the same within() check
that CVE-2026-55667 added, so eviction can no longer follow a symlink out of
scope. The redis backend ignores the callback (it never deleted partial files).
Refs GHSA-m9f5-2232-frp6