chore: add symlink tests

http/resource_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package fbhttp
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/asdine/storm/v3"
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
+	"github.com/spf13/afero"
+
+	"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/diskcache"
+	"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings"
+	"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/storage/bolt"
+	"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/users"
+)
+
+func TestResourceCopyDoesNotDereferenceEscapingSymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	userScope := filepath.Join(root, "user")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir"), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// An ordinary in-scope file, to prove a normal copy still works.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir", "normal.txt"), []byte("in-scope"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// The secret living outside the user's scope.
+	secret := filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("OUT-OF-SCOPE-SECRET"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// An escaping symlink planted inside the user's scope (out-of-band, as the
+	// advisory's preconditions describe).
+	if err := os.Symlink(secret, filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir", "link.txt")); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("cannot create symlink: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	key := []byte("test-signing-key")
+
+	db, err := storm.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to open db: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+
+	st, err := bolt.NewStorage(db)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to get storage: %v", err)
+	}
+	perm := users.Permissions{Create: true, Modify: true, Download: true, Rename: true}
+	if err := st.Users.Save(&users.User{Username: "u", Password: "pw", Perm: perm}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to save user: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := st.Settings.Save(&settings.Settings{Key: key}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to save settings: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The user's scope is the real on-disk userScope. customFSUser.Get wraps it
+	// in a ScopedFs, mirroring production (users.User init).
+	st.Users = &customFSUser{
+		Store: st.Users,
+		fs:    afero.NewBasePathFs(afero.NewOsFs(), userScope),
+	}
+
+	signed := signToken(t, perm, key)
+
+	t.Run("direct raw read is forbidden", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/srcdir/link.txt", http.NoBody)
+		req.Header.Set("X-Auth", signed)
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handle(rawHandler, "", st, &settings.Server{}).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		if rec.Code == http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("VULNERABLE: direct raw read of escaping symlink returned 200, body=%q", rec.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("recursive copy does not exfiltrate", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/srcdir/", http.NoBody)
+		q := req.URL.Query()
+		q.Set("action", "copy")
+		q.Set("destination", "/dstdir")
+		req.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
+		req.Header.Set("X-Auth", signed)
+
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handle(resourcePatchHandler(diskcache.NewNoOp()), "", st, &settings.Server{}).ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		t.Logf("copy status=%d body=%q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+		// The escaping symlink's target content must never appear in scope.
+		leaked := filepath.Join(userScope, "dstdir", "link.txt")
+		if data, readErr := os.ReadFile(leaked); readErr == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("VULNERABLE: out-of-scope content landed in scope at %s: %q", leaked, string(data))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func signToken(t *testing.T, perm users.Permissions, key []byte) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	claims := &authToken{
+		User: userInfo{ID: 1, Username: "u", Perm: perm},
+		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
+			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)),
+			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)),
+		},
+	}
+	signed, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims).SignedString(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to sign token: %v", err)
+	}
+	return signed
+}