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* security: allow integrator sessionID cookie to be HttpOnly (#7045) The integrator-set sessionID cookie was forced to be non-HttpOnly because Etherpad's own client JS read it via document.cookie and forwarded it in the socket.io CLIENT_READY payload, exposing it to XSS. Mirror the GDPR PR3 author-token migration: read sessionID from the socket.io handshake's Cookie header in PadMessageHandler.handleClientReady, falling back to the legacy message-level field with a one-time deprecation warning per socket. Drop the client-side Cookies.get('sessionID') reads in pad.ts and timeslider.ts so the field is no longer sent by current clients. Existing integrators that set sessionID without HttpOnly keep working unchanged; the field on the message becomes optional and integrators should now mark the cookie HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax. Closes #7045 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): treat undecodable handshake cookies as absent (Qodo #7755) decodeURIComponent() throws URIError on malformed values like `%ZZ`. The unguarded call in PadMessageHandler.handleClientReady's readCookie() let a single bad cookie abort CLIENT_READY for that socket, allowing unauthenticated peers to spam server error logs and lock themselves out of pads. Catch URIError and treat the value as absent so the legacy message-level field still serves as a fallback. Other error classes still propagate. Add a backend test that asserts a `sessionID=%ZZ` cookie no longer aborts the handshake. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ Etherpad HTTP API clients may make use (if they choose so) to send another cooki
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| Name | Sample value | Domain | Usage description |
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|-----------|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| sessionID | s.1c70968b333b25476a2c7bdd0e0bed17 | example.org | Sessions can be created between a group and an author. This allows an author to access more than one group. The sessionID will be set as a cookie to the client and is valid until a certain date. The session cookie can also contain multiple comma-separated sessionIDs, allowing a user to edit pads in different groups at the same time. More info - https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/blob/develop/doc/api/http_api.md#session |
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| sessionID | s.1c70968b333b25476a2c7bdd0e0bed17 | example.org | Sessions can be created between a group and an author. This allows an author to access more than one group. The sessionID is set as a cookie by the integrator and is valid until a certain date. The session cookie can also contain multiple comma-separated sessionIDs, allowing a user to edit pads in different groups at the same time. Since [#7045](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/issues/7045) Etherpad reads this cookie server-side from the socket.io handshake, so integrators **should** set it as `HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax` to mitigate XSS. More info - https://github.com/ether/etherpad-lite/blob/develop/doc/api/http_api.md#session |
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