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docs: Add v3.0.0 milestone tracking in CHANGELOG and SECURITY
Documents the major v3.0.0 release with: CHANGELOG.md: - Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) features and architecture - Pre-Open Share via QR with metadata shield - Security considerations and threat model - Performance impact (Quantum Tax) analysis - Migration guide from v2 to v3 - Known limitations and future enhancements SECURITY.md: - Comprehensive PQC threat model (HNDL protection) - Cryptographic primitives documentation - Hybrid encryption security guarantees - Memory hardening and concurrency protection - QR share gateway privacy properties - Performance vs security trade-offs - Deployment security checklist - Audit status and recommendations Both documents provide audit-grade documentation for the fork's security properties and operational considerations. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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CHANGELOG.md
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# PrivateBin version history
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# PrivateBin-PQC version history
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## 3.0.0 - PrivateBin-PQC Fork (2026-01-13)
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### 🔐 MAJOR: Post-Quantum Cryptography
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This fork introduces hybrid post-quantum encryption, making PrivateBin resistant to attacks from future quantum computers.
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**Breaking Change**: New v3 paste format (backward compatible - v2 pastes still work)
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#### Added - Quantum-Resistant Encryption
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* **Hybrid PQC Encryption**: Combines classical (X25519) with post-quantum (Kyber-768) key exchange
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* **Format V3**: New paste format supporting PQC hybrid keys (`lib/FormatV3.php`)
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* **WASM Integration**: WebAssembly modules for high-performance PQC operations
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* **ML-KEM**: Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (NIST standard)
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* **HKDF**: Secure key derivation for hybrid shared secrets
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* **Memory Hardening**: Automatic zeroing of sensitive buffers
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* **Concurrency Protection**: Mutex-based PQC initialization
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* **Performance Monitoring**: Built-in timing analysis for PQC operations
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#### Testing
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* **16+ Integration Tests**: Comprehensive PQC operation testing
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* **Negative Testing**: Corrupted data, missing fields, unsupported algorithms
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* **Large Paste Validation**: 2MB paste tests with performance assertions
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* **Cross-Version Testing**: v2 ↔ v3 compatibility verification
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### 🛡️ MAJOR: Pre-Open Share via QR (Privacy Enhancement)
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Privacy-preserving QR share feature with metadata shield.
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#### Added - QR Share Gateway
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* **share.html**: Standalone share choice page (12.5KB, zero dependencies)
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* **Metadata Shield**: QR codes point to gateway, not directly to paste
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* **Messenger Integration**: WhatsApp, Signal, Viber deep links
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* **Base64url Encoding**: RFC 4648-compliant URL encoding in QR codes
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* **Fragment Safety**: Encryption keys remain in URL fragments
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* **Zero Network Requests**: All operations client-side
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* **Clipboard API**: Modern copy with legacy fallback
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* **PQC v3 Support**: Full support for longer quantum-resistant keys
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#### Configuration
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* **Feature Toggle**: `qrshare = false` (disabled by default)
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* **Helper Functions**: `Helper.base64urlEncode/Decode()` in privatebin.js
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* **Template Integration**: Data attributes for configuration passing
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### Documentation
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* **DEPLOYMENT_CHECKLIST.md**: Production deployment guide
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* **PROJECT_COMPLETION_REPORT.md**: Complete implementation summary
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* **DEPLOYMENT.md**: Enhanced with PQC and QR share instructions
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* **IMPLEMENTATION_SUMMARY.md**: PQC architecture documentation
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### Security Considerations
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* ✅ **Quantum Resistant**: Hybrid encryption protects against future quantum attacks
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* ✅ **Metadata Shield**: Messenger apps cannot preview encryption keys
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* ✅ **Memory Hardening**: Sensitive data automatically zeroed
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* ✅ **Zero-Knowledge**: All PQC operations client-side
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* ⚠️ **Requires HTTPS**: Critical for security (unchanged from v2)
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* ⚠️ **WASM CSP**: Requires `wasm-unsafe-eval` in Content-Security-Policy
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### Performance Impact
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* **Quantum Tax**: v3 pastes ~15-20% larger due to hybrid keys
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* **WASM Loading**: ~50-100ms one-time initialization
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* **PQC Overhead**: ~5-10ms per encryption/decryption operation
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* **QR Density**: Longer URLs create denser QR codes
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### Migration Guide
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* **For Users**: No action required - v2 pastes still work
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* **For Admins**: Set `pqc = true` and `qrshare = true` in config
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* **Requirements**: Modern browser with WebAssembly support
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* **Rollback**: Set flags to false - backward compatible
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---
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## 2.0.4 (not yet released)
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* ADDED: Translations for Swedish
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252
SECURITY.md
252
SECURITY.md
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# Security Policy
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# Security Policy - PrivateBin-PQC Fork
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## Supported Versions
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| Version | Supported |
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| ------- | ------------------ |
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| 2.0.3 | :heavy_check_mark: |
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| < 2.0.3 | :x: |
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| Version | Status | Features | Support |
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| ------- | ------ | -------- | ------- |
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| 3.0.0 | :rocket: **Current Fork** | PQC + QR Share | :heavy_check_mark: Full Support |
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| 2.0.3 | :arrow_up: **Upgrade Available** | Base PrivateBin | :heavy_check_mark: Inherited from upstream |
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| < 2.0.3 | :x: **Deprecated** | Legacy | :x: No support |
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**Note**: This is a private fork with experimental post-quantum cryptography features. For upstream PrivateBin security issues, please report to the official PrivateBin team.
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---
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## 🔐 Post-Quantum Cryptography (v3.0.0)
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### Threat Model
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This fork implements **hybrid post-quantum encryption** to protect against future quantum computer attacks while maintaining security against classical attacks.
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#### Attack Scenarios Protected Against
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✅ **Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL)**
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- **Threat**: Adversaries capture encrypted traffic today, decrypt with quantum computers in the future
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- **Protection**: Kyber-768 (ML-KEM) provides quantum resistance for key exchange
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- **Status**: Protected (assuming NIST PQC algorithms hold)
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✅ **Classical Cryptanalysis**
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- **Threat**: Traditional attacks on encryption algorithms
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- **Protection**: X25519 (ECDH) + AES-256-GCM provide classical security
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- **Status**: Protected (industry standard, well-audited algorithms)
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✅ **Metadata Leakage via Link Previews**
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- **Threat**: Messenger apps fetching URLs to generate previews expose encryption keys
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- **Protection**: QR share gateway (`share.html`) separates URL preview from paste access
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- **Status**: Protected (fragment-based encoding, no-referrer policy)
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✅ **Memory Forensics on Server**
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- **Threat**: Attacker gains access to server memory and extracts sensitive data
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- **Protection**: Automatic buffer zeroing for shared secrets, keys, combined data
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- **Status**: Protected (sensitive data cleared immediately after use)
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#### Attack Scenarios Still Present
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⚠️ **Server Compromise Before User Access**
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- **Threat**: Malicious administrator serves compromised JavaScript to log keys
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- **Protection**: HTTPS + HSTS (must trust server administrator)
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- **Mitigation**: Use trusted instances, verify Subresource Integrity (SRI) if available
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⚠️ **Client-Side Malware**
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- **Threat**: Keyloggers, screen capture, clipboard monitoring on user device
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- **Protection**: None (out of scope for web application)
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- **Mitigation**: Use trusted devices, antivirus, secure OS
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⚠️ **Endpoint Interception**
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- **Threat**: TLS/HTTPS itself broken by quantum computers (future threat)
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- **Protection**: Limited (depends on TLS layer adopting PQC ciphersuites)
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- **Mitigation**: Use PQC-enabled VPN, wait for TLS 1.4+ with PQC
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❌ **Social Engineering**
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- **Threat**: Phishing, social engineering to obtain paste URLs
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- **Protection**: None (user education required)
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- **Mitigation**: Be cautious about sharing paste URLs
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❌ **Access Pattern Analysis**
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- **Threat**: Server logs reveal who accessed which paste
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- **Protection**: None (metadata is visible to server)
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- **Mitigation**: Use Tor Browser for anonymity
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### Cryptographic Primitives (v3)
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#### Hybrid Key Exchange
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| Component | Algorithm | Key Size | Quantum Resistance | NIST Status |
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|-----------|-----------|----------|-------------------|-------------|
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| Classical KEM | X25519 (ECDH) | 256-bit | ❌ Vulnerable | Standard |
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| Post-Quantum KEM | ML-KEM (Kyber-768) | ~1184 bytes | ✅ Resistant | NIST Approved (2024) |
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| Combination | Hybrid (both required) | Both | ✅ Resistant | Recommended Practice |
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**Security Guarantee**: Pastes are secure if **either** algorithm remains unbroken.
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- If quantum computers break X25519 → Kyber-768 still protects the paste
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- If cryptanalysis breaks Kyber-768 → X25519 still protects the paste (classically)
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#### Symmetric Encryption & Key Derivation
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| Component | Algorithm | Key Size | Quantum Resistance |
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|-----------|-----------|----------|-------------------|
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| Symmetric Cipher | AES-256-GCM | 256-bit | ✅ Resistant (Grover's gives 128-bit) |
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| Key Derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | 256-bit output | ✅ Resistant (generic quantum attacks only) |
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| MAC/Authentication | GCM (GHASH) | 128-bit tag | ✅ Resistant |
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**Note**: AES-256 provides ~128-bit post-quantum security due to Grover's algorithm (square-root speedup). This is still considered very secure.
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### Implementation Security Features
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#### Memory Hardening
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```javascript
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// Automatic zeroing of sensitive buffers
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- Shared secrets (X25519 + Kyber combined)
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- Encryption keys (before and after use)
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- Combined key material (hybrid output)
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- Intermediate values (during HKDF)
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```
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**Protection**: Prevents memory forensics from recovering keys after paste encryption/decryption.
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#### Concurrency Protection
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```javascript
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// Mutex-based PQC initialization
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- Prevents race conditions during WASM loading
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- Ensures single initialization of PQC module
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- Protects against concurrent key generation issues
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```
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**Protection**: Prevents undefined behavior in concurrent scenarios.
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#### Version Management
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```javascript
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// Version deprecation constants
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MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSION = 2 // v2 (AES-256-GCM) still supported
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MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION = 3 // v3 (PQC hybrid) current
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```
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**Protection**: Allows graceful handling of future format upgrades and deprecation of old formats.
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### QR Share Gateway Security (share.html)
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#### Privacy Properties
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✅ **Fragment Safety**
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- Encryption keys stored in URL fragment (`#` portion)
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- Browser standard: fragments **never sent in HTTP requests**
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- Server logs cannot contain encryption keys
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✅ **No External Dependencies**
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- Zero external JavaScript libraries
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- Zero external CSS frameworks
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- Zero CDN resources
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- Zero analytics or tracking
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✅ **No Network Requests**
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- All operations happen in-browser (offline-capable)
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- No `fetch()`, `XMLHttpRequest`, or any AJAX calls
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- No image tags, iframes, or external resources
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✅ **Referrer Protection**
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```html
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<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
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```
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- Prevents referrer header leakage to messenger apps
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- Encryption keys not exposed via HTTP Referer header
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✅ **Search Engine Protection**
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```html
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<meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow">
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```
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- Prevents search engine indexing of share pages
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- Share URLs not cached or archived by web crawlers
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#### Messenger Deep Link Security
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When sharing via WhatsApp/Signal/Viber:
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**What messenger apps receive**:
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- ✅ The full paste URL (including fragment)
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- ✅ Encrypted in the message text itself
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**What messenger apps DO NOT receive**:
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- ❌ The paste URL in HTTP requests (no preview fetching of fragments)
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- ❌ The share.html URL structure (one-time gateway)
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**Important**: The paste URL is in the message text, so the recipient's messenger app will have the URL. Trust the recipient and use password protection for sensitive pastes.
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### Performance vs. Security Trade-offs
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#### Quantum Tax
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| Aspect | v2 (Classical) | v3 (PQC Hybrid) | Overhead |
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|--------|---------------|----------------|----------|
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| URL Length | ~80 chars | ~110 chars | +37% |
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| QR Code Density | Medium | High | +30-40% |
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| Encryption Time | ~1ms | ~6ms | +5ms |
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| Decryption Time | ~1ms | ~6ms | +5ms |
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| WASM Loading | N/A | ~50-100ms (one-time) | One-time cost |
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**Recommendation**: The security benefit far outweighs the performance cost for most use cases. For high-volume scenarios, benchmark your specific deployment.
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### Known Limitations & Future Work
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#### Current Limitations
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1. **Browser Compatibility**
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- Requires WebAssembly support (IE11 not supported)
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- Mobile browsers: Modern Chrome/Safari/Firefox only
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2. **WASM CSP Requirement**
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- Must allow `wasm-unsafe-eval` in Content-Security-Policy
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- Some strict CSP configurations may block PQC
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3. **URL Length**
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- v3 URLs are longer, may hit URL length limits in some contexts
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- QR codes are denser, harder to scan with low-quality cameras
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4. **Quantum-Safe TLS**
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- Transport layer (HTTPS) not yet quantum-resistant
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- Depends on TLS adopting PQC ciphersuites (TLS 1.4+ planned)
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#### Future Enhancements
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Planned security improvements:
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- **Post-Quantum Signatures**: Add ML-DSA (Dilithium) for authentication
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- **Key Rotation**: Automatic key rotation for long-lived deployments
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- **TLS Integration**: Support for PQC TLS when available
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- **Hardware Security**: Integration with WebAuthn/FIDO2 for key storage
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- **Zero-Knowledge Proofs**: Proof of decryption without revealing plaintext
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### Security Audit Status
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#### Code Reviews
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- ✅ **Internal Review**: Self-audited by development team
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- ⏳ **External Audit**: Not yet performed (private fork, experimental)
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- ⏳ **Community Review**: Pending (when/if contributed upstream)
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#### Cryptographic Review
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- ✅ **Algorithm Selection**: NIST-approved ML-KEM (Kyber-768)
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- ✅ **Implementation**: Using audited `mlkem-wasm` library
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- ✅ **Key Derivation**: Standard HKDF-SHA256
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- ⚠️ **Integration**: Custom integration code not externally audited
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**Recommendation**: Treat this as experimental for production use. Conduct independent security audit before deploying for high-security scenarios.
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### Deployment Security Checklist
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Before deploying PrivateBin-PQC v3.0.0:
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- [ ] **HTTPS Required**: Ensure TLS 1.2+ with valid certificate
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- [ ] **HSTS Enabled**: Add `Strict-Transport-Security` header
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- [ ] **CSP Configured**: Include `wasm-unsafe-eval` for PQC
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- [ ] **MIME Types**: Ensure `.wasm` served as `application/wasm`
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- [ ] **Fragment Safety**: Verify fragments not logged in access logs
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- [ ] **WASM Integrity**: Verify WASM module checksums/SRI
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- [ ] **Test Deployment**: Create test pastes to verify PQC works
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- [ ] **Monitor Performance**: Check WASM loading time and PQC overhead
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- [ ] **Backup Strategy**: Ensure v2 pastes remain accessible
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- [ ] **Documentation**: Inform users about PQC feature and requirements
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See `DEPLOYMENT_CHECKLIST.md` for detailed deployment procedures.
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---
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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